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  INTRODUCTION   
For decades, tax jurisprudence and scholarship have suf-
fered from what has been labeled “tax exceptionalism”—the 
perception that tax law is so different from the rest of the regu-
latory state that general administrative law doctrines and 
principles do not apply.1 This “tax myopia” has come under 
greater scrutiny in recent years.2  
The death of tax exceptionalism is perhaps best exempli-
fied by the Supreme Court’s 2011 decision in Mayo Foundation 
for Medical Education & Research v. United States.3 There, the 
Court refused to apply a less deferential standard of review to 
the Treasury Department’s interpretation of the tax code.4 In 
holding that Chevron5 deference applies with full force to tax 
 
 1. See, e.g., Kristin E. Hickman, The Need for Mead: Rejecting Tax 
Exceptionalism in Judicial Deference, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1537, 1541 (2006) (de-
scribing the “perception of tax exceptionalism that intrudes upon much con-
temporary tax scholarship and jurisprudence”); see also Richard E. Levy & 
Robert L. Glicksman, Agency-Specific Precedents, 89 TEX. L. REV. 499, 515–26 
(2011) (documenting IRS-specific precedents that depart unjustifiably from 
general administrative law doctrines). 
 2. See Paul L. Caron, Tax Myopia, or Mamas Don’t Let Your Babies Grow 
Up to Be Tax Lawyers, 13 VA. TAX REV. 517, 518–19 (1994) (arguing that “tax 
law too often is mistakenly viewed by lawyers, judges, and law professors as a 
self-contained body of law” and that “this misperception has impaired the de-
velopment of tax law by shielding it from other areas of law that should inform 
the tax debate”). Indeed, the Duke Law Journal recently dedicated a symposi-
um to the topic—aptly titled Taking Administrative Law to Tax. See 
Amandeep S. Grewal, Foreword: Taking Administrative Law to Tax, 63 DUKE 
L.J. 1625 (2014). 
 3. 131 S. Ct. 704 (2011). 
 4. Id. at 713–14. 
 5. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). 
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regulations, the unanimous Mayo Court indicated it was “not 
inclined to carve out an approach to administrative review good 
for tax law only,” noting that it has “expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] 
the importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial 
review of administrative action.’”6 To the contrary, the Court 
found “no reason why . . . review of tax regulations should not 
be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same 
extent as . . . review of other regulations.”7  
Similarly, the D.C. Circuit recently rejected a tax 
exceptionalism argument advanced by the Internal Revenue 
Service (IRS). In Cohen v. United States, the D.C. Circuit held 
en banc that the judicial review provisions of the Administra-
tive Procedure Act (APA) apply with full force to a form of IRS 
guidance known as a notice.8 In reaching this conclusion, the 
court remarked that “[t]he IRS is not special in this regard; no 
exception exists shielding it—unlike the rest of the Federal 
Government—from suit under the APA.”9 To be sure, “[t]here 
may be good policy reasons to exempt IRS action from judicial 
review [under the APA]. Revenue protection is one. But Con-
gress has not made that call. And we are in no position to usurp 
that choice . . . .”10 
As Kristin Hickman has observed, “[t]aken together, these 
cases have given tax lawyers a fresh awareness of administra-
tive law doctrine as relevant to their field.”11 Patrick Smith, for 
instance, has remarked that “by far the most important aspect 
of Mayo, apart from the holding that Chevron applies to tax 
regulations, was the Supreme Court’s emphasis on the princi-
ple that tax law is subject to the same administrative law rules 
that apply in all other areas of federal law.”12 And Thomas 
Greenway has proclaimed that Mayo “cured decades of ‘tax my-
 
 6. Mayo, 131 S. Ct. at 713 (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 
(1999)). Mayo was an 8–0 decision with Justice Kagan recused. Id. at 716. 
 7. Id. at 713 
 8. Cohen v. United States, 650 F.3d 717, 736 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (en banc).  
 9. Id. at 723. 
 10. Id. at 736 (citations omitted). 
 11. Kristin E. Hickman, Unpacking the Force of Law, 66 VAND. L. REV. 
465, 466 (2013). Professor Hickman’s recent empirical work has given more 
cause for concern about tax exceptionalism, finding that the Treasury and IRS 
engage in a substantial amount of nontax regulation. Kristin E. Hickman, 
Administering the Tax System We Have, 63 DUKE L.J. 1717, 1747, 1760–61 
(2014). 
 12. Patrick J. Smith, Life After Mayo: Silver Linings, 131 TAX NOTES 
1251, 1256 (2011). 
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opia’ ” that had “afflict[ed] practitioners who cannot see beyond 
the self-contained world of tax.”13 
This Article turns to another area where tax 
exceptionalism persists: the status of the United States Tax 
Court in the modern administrative state.14 The Tax Court 
plays an important role in the life of the federal judiciary. It 
functions as a tax specialist and hears over ninety-five percent 
of federal tax-related litigation.15 The overall volume of its work 
is impressive. As of 1995, for instance, the court had heard ap-
proximately 360,000 cases with total tax liabilities reaching 
about $34 billion.16 And the number of cases filed, closed, and 
still pending has generally risen each year. From 2000 to 2010, 
the Tax Court closed nearly 260,000 cases while nearly 265,000 
cases were filed during the same period.17 Regardless of this 
large number of cases, the Tax Court still had over 250,000 
cases pending.18 Of the cases closed, the court released written 
opinions for over 8,400 of them.19 The dollar amount is also 
staggering. In 2006, the Tax Court closed cases with an aggre-
gate tax liability of nearly $7.4 billion.20 From fiscal year 2008 
to 2012, the Tax Court closed cases with an aggregate amount 
exceeding $33 billion.21  
 
 13. Thomas Greenaway, Mayo Foundation Cures Tax Myopia, KPMG 
WHAT’S NEWS IN TAX 1 (Jan. 17, 2011), http://taxprof.typepad.com/files/ 
mayo-kpmg.pdf. But see Lawrence Zelenak, Maybe Just a Little Bit Special, 
After All?, 63 DUKE L.J. 1897 (2014) (providing partial defense of tax 
exceptionalism). 
 14. While not addressing the APA question at issue here, Leandra Le-
derman has made a similar call that the Tax Court be treated more like the 
rest of the judiciary. See Leandra Lederman, Tax Appeal: A Proposal To Make 
the United States Tax Court More Judicial, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1195, 1199 
(2008) [hereinafter Lederman, Tax Appeal] (arguing that “Congress should 
recognize the entirely judicial nature of the Tax Court by making it subject to 
the [Administrative Office of U.S. Courts]; the Rules Enabling Act; and, with 
respect to its rulemaking, the Judicial Conference”); see also Leandra Leder-
man, (Un)Appealing Deference to the Tax Court, 63 DUKE L.J. 1835 (2014) 
[hereinafter Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference] (arguing that federal courts 
of appeals do not, and should not, give more deference to Tax Court decisions 
than they do to those of other trial courts). 
 15. David Laro, The Evolution of the Tax Court as an Independent Tribu-
nal, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 17, 18 (1995). 
 16. Id. 
 17. See 2000–2010 U.S. TAX CT. ANN. REP. tbl.4 (on file with author). 
18.See id.  
 19. See id. 
 20. 1996–2006 U.S. TAX CT. ANN. REP. tbl.4. 
 21. INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 61 tbl.27 (2012) [hereinafter 
IRS 2012 DATA BOOK], http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/12databk.pdf; INTERNAL 
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The sheer magnitude of the Tax Court’s jurisdiction sug-
gests that its internal rules—such as the standard and scope of 
review of IRS actions—are of national importance. Yet little 
has been done to conform the Tax Court’s standards and proce-
dures to those of its sister courts—the Article III federal dis-
trict courts and the Article I United States Court of Federal 
Claims, which similarly adjudicate tax disputes but consider 
themselves bound by the judicial review provisions of the 
APA.22 Rather, the Tax Court has remained insular. It plays by 
its own rules, and has repeatedly affirmed that “[t]he APA has 
never governed proceedings in the Court (or in the Board of Tax 
Appeals).”23  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, federal courts have reached con-
flicting conclusions about whether the Tax Court is bound by 
the APA’s default judicial review standards when reviewing 
IRS actions. The Fifth and D.C. Circuits have disagreed with 
the Tax Court’s current position and held that the Tax Court is 
bound by the APA’s default review standard, which is abuse of 
discretion.24 The Eleventh Circuit has also held that the APA’s 
abuse-of-discretion standard of review applies, but in a divided 
opinion concluded that the scope of review is de novo (not lim-
ited to the administrative record).25 By contrast, the First and 
Eighth Circuits have held that the Tax Court is bound by the 
APA’s default scope of review.26 And, most recently, the Ninth 
Circuit in Wilson v. Commissioner held that neither the APA’s 
 
REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 61 tbl.27 (2011), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs 
-soi/11databk.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 61 tbl.27 (2010), 
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/10databk.pdf; INTERNAL REVENUE SERV., DATA 
BOOK 61 tbl.27 (2009), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/09databk.pdf; INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERV., DATA BOOK 61 tbl.27 (2008), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs 
-soi/08databkrevised.pdf. The amount in controversy figure includes penalties 
but excludes interest owed on past due liabilities. 
 22. See infra Part II.B (discussing approaches in Article III federal courts 
and Article I United States Court of Federal Claims). 
 23. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 96 (2004), rev’d 439 F.3d 455 (8th 
Cir. 2006); see also, e.g., O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575, 580 (4th Cir. 1959) 
(“The Tax Court, rather than being a ‘reviewing court’, within the meaning of 
Sec. 10(e) [of the APA] reviewing the ‘record’, is a court in which the facts are 
triable de novo. . . .”), aff’g 28 T.C. 698 (1957); Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 
117 (2008) (“Since its enactment in 1946 the APA has generally not governed 
proceedings in this Court (or in its predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals).”). 
 24. See Mitchell v. Comm’r, 292 F.3d 800, 807 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (innocent 
spouse claim); Cheshire v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 2002) (same). 
 25. Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1276–78 (11th Cir. 2009) (innocent 
spouse claim). But see id. at 1281 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting).  
 26. Murphy v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2006) (collection due pro-
cess claim); Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 2006) (same). 
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default standard of review nor its default scope of review ap-
plied; instead, both are de novo.27 As Judge Bybee (a former 
administrative law professor) explained in his dissent in Wil-
son, “The question is of more than passing interest. It goes to 
the heart of the place of the Tax Court in our administrative 
system. The question has splintered the Tax Court, which has 
proceeded along three different paths, dragging four circuit 
courts with them in the process.”28  
The IRS, despite publicly disagreeing with the majority in 
Wilson, has acquiesced in the court’s holding.29 In certain cas-
es—equitable innocent spouse cases—it will no longer argue 
that the Tax Court should review for abuse of discretion or lim-
it its review to evidence in the administrative record.30 But with 
the supersized Ninth Circuit joining the Tax Court’s side of the 
split—with four circuits on the other side and the Eleventh Cir-
cuit somewhere in between—it was likely only a matter of time 
before the Supreme Court intervened to resolve the disagree-
ment among the lower courts and clarify the Tax Court’s proper 
place in the administrative state.31 
Following the Supreme Court’s lead in Mayo (and the D.C. 
Circuit’s in Cohen), this Article calls for the IRS to resume its 
fight and for the Tax Court to abandon tax exceptionalism—a 
misperception that has persisted since (at least) Congress offi-
cially transformed the Tax Court from an independent agency 
into an Article I court in 1969.32 Instead, the Tax Court should 
return to first principles of administrative law, including the 
 
 27. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 994 (9th Cir. 2013) (innocent spouse 
relief claim). But see id. at 996 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 28. Id. at 995. 
 29. I.R.S. Actions Relating to Court Decisions, 2013–25 I.R.B. (June 17, 
2013). 
 30. See I.R.S. Notice, CC-2013-011 (Jun. 7, 2013). 
 31. See David C. Frederick, Christopher J. Walker & David M. Burke, The 
Insider’s Guide to the Supreme Court of the United States, in APPELLATE 
PRACTICE COMPENDIUM 1, 7 (Dana Livingston ed., 2012) (“[T]he critical factor 
motivating the Court’s exercise of discretion is whether the decision below con-
flicts with the decision(s) of other federal courts of appeals . . . .”).  
 32. See 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2012) (“There is hereby established, under arti-
cle I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to be known as 
the United States Tax Court.”); see also Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax 
Court: An Historical Analysis—Part IV: The Board Becomes a Court, 41 ALB. 
L. REV. 1, 40–51 (1977), reprinted in DUBROFF, infra note 41, at 204–15. Pro-
fessor Fahey has reached a similar conclusion in the context of collection due 
process. Diane L. Fahey, Is the United States Tax Court Exempt from Adminis-
trative Law Jurisprudence When Acting as a Reviewing Court?, 58 CLEV. ST. L. 
REV. 603, 605 (2010).  
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well-settled rule that, when reviewing federal agency actions, 
“a reviewing court must apply the APA’s court/agency review 
standards in the absence of an exception.”33 By starting with 
the APA as the default, it becomes clearer which IRS actions 
are subject to the default APA rules (e.g., innocent spouse and 
collection due process claims) and which may not be (i.e., tax 
deficiency redeterminations), based on congressional override 
in the Internal Revenue Code of the APA default standards. 
The Article proceeds as follows. Part I traces the evolution 
of the Tax Court from an independent executive agency created 
in 1924 to an Article I court in 1969 and the accompanying ex-
pansion of its jurisdiction to adjudicate tax-related disputes. 
Part I focuses on three types of Tax Court jurisdiction: tax defi-
ciency redeterminations, innocent spouse relief claims, and col-
lection due process claims. Understanding the Tax Court’s his-
tory—including that it was converted from an agency to a court 
(in 1969) after the enactment of the APA (in 1946)—helps ex-
plain its misguided reliance on tax exceptionalism and how to 
reorient the Tax Court on first principles of administrative law. 
Part II presents the legal case for why the Tax Court is 
governed by the APA. The Supreme Court has been clear that 
the APA applies to any judicial review of federal agency ac-
tion.34 The APA establishes the default standards for judicial 
review of federal agency action.35 Under the APA, “agency” is 
defined to include “each authority of the Government of the 
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review 
by another agency, but does not include,” among other entities, 
Congress and “the courts of the United States.”36 The APA judi-
cial review standards apply to any “reviewing court” of agency 
action.37 The IRS, an executive agency within the Treasury De-
partment, is plainly an “agency” for purposes of the APA. And 
while the Tax Court used to be an agency before the enactment 
of the APA, as of 1969 it is an Article I court. For purposes of 
the APA, it is thus “a court of the United States,”38 and, for its 
review of IRS agency actions, a “reviewing court” subject to the 
 
 33. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999). 
 34. Id. at 154. 
 35. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 89–554, 80 Stat. 378 (1946) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
 36. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b) (2012). 
 37. Id. § 706. 
 38. Id. § 702; accord id. § 701(b). 
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APA’s judicial review provisions.39 Part II then evaluates the 
judicial review provisions provided in the Internal Revenue 
Code with respect to the three claims discussed in Part I to de-
termine which of the Tax Court’s proceedings are not subject to 
the APA’s default standards. 
Part III details the policy case against Tax Court 
exceptionalism, including considerations of separation of pow-
ers, agency expertise, consistent application of the law, efficient 
allocation of resources, and horizontal and vertical equity. This 
Part considers perhaps the most compelling tax policy argu-
ment against applying the more agency-deferential APA stand-
ards in the Tax Court: concerns for the less sophisticated tax-
payer who attempts to navigate the system without 
representation. At first blush, the Tax Court’s current approach 
of more searching de novo review may appear to best protect 
the unrepresented taxpayer. In contrast, by confining review to 
abuse of discretion and prohibiting consideration of evidence 
outside of the administrative record, the APA limits a court’s 
ability to grant relief when it feels such relief may be merited. 
Moreover, by following traditional administrative law doc-
trines, the Tax Court may be required to remand cases to the 
IRS when it finds error instead of just granting the relief out-
right. The Tax Court may be reluctant to adhere to this ordi-
nary remand rule when it believes the taxpayer is entitled to 
relief and remand would unduly delay or, worse, preclude relief 
because the taxpayer would get lost in the process on remand.  
Despite the commonsense appeal of more searching review, 
Part III takes the novel and counterintuitive position that the 
APA’s default regime is actually more effective at addressing 
these concerns by allowing the Tax Court to have a more sys-
temic effect on IRS decision-making. Federal courts in other 
agency review contexts have developed a number of tools to 
help ensure that petitioners do not get lost on remand.40 By us-
ing these tools and developing more of its own, the Tax Court 
can begin a richer dialogue with the IRS—a dialogue aimed at 
improving the IRS’s procedures and decision-making not only 
in the case remanded but also in the agency overall. Such dia-
logue is critical to improving the treatment of less sophisticated 
 
 39. Id. § 706. 
 40. See Christopher J. Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule and the Judi-
cial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) 
[hereinafter Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule], available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2242869. 
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taxpayers—many of whom, unrepresented, do not even seek ju-
dicial review of the IRS’s adverse determinations. 
The Article concludes by advocating that the the Tax Court 
abandon tax exceptionalism and return to first principles of 
administrative law. Not only does the law require the Tax 
Court to follow the APA when reviewing IRS actions, but ad-
ministrative law and tax policy considerations support it. Im-
portantly, and somewhat counterintuitively, adhering to the 
general rules of administrative law—including the ordinary 
remand rule—could help the Tax Court improve IRS proce-
dures and decision-making by enhancing the court-agency dia-
logue. In light of the demise of tax exceptionalism in other con-
texts, the policy considerations that counsel such death here, 
and the growing conflict among the federal courts of appeals, 
the Tax Court should reverse course. If the IRS resumed its 
fight, it would likely be only a matter of time before the Su-
preme Court (or Congress) intervened and extended the reason-
ing in Mayo to declare the death of tax exceptionalism in yet 
another area of tax law. 
I.  THE EVOLUTION OF THE TAX COURT   
The Tax Court’s exceptionalist view that it is not subject to 
the APA is in large part a creature of its unconventional histo-
ry. This Part explores the Tax Court’s shifting status in the 
administrative state and the expanding nature of the Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction to help explain the widespread confusion 
among courts about whether (and when) the Tax Court is sub-
ject to the APA default judicial review provisions. 
A. SHIFTING CONSTITUTIONAL AND ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 
STATUS 
The Tax Court’s constitutional status has shifted greatly 
over the last century. Over the years numerous scholars have 
detailed the Tax Court’s historical evolution from an independ-
ent executive agency to an Article I court.41 So the full story will 
not be repeated here. Instead, we focus on the Tax Court’s 
 
 41. See, e.g., Fahey, supra note 32, at 615–43; Lederman, Tax Appeal, su-
pra note 14, at 1200–16. See generally HAROLD DUBROFF, THE UNITED STATES 
TAX COURT: AN HISTORICAL ANALYSIS 1–215 (1979) (reprinting series of arti-
cles first published in the Albany Law Review); Bryan T. Camp, A History of 
Tax Regulation Prior to the Administrative Procedure Act, 63 DUKE L.J. 1673, 
1684 (2014) (“The world of the APA started in 1947, but the world of U.S. tax 
administration began in 1789.”). 
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shifting place in the modern administrative state and how that 
affects whether the Tax Court is a “court” or an “agency” (or 
neither, as is the Tax Court’s current position) under the APA. 
In 1924, Congress created the Board of Tax Appeals 
(“Board”).42 As the name suggests, the Board was not a court, 
but an independent agency located in the executive branch.43 
The Board functioned as “an impartial tribunal to provide tax-
payers with some opportunity to dispute a tax before assess-
ment and collection.”44 For deficiency proceedings, the scope of 
review was “a complete hearing de novo according to the rules 
of evidence applicable in courts of equity of the District of Co-
lumbia.”45 Board decisions were appealable to federal district 
courts, where “the findings of the Board shall be prima facie ev-
idence of the facts therein stated.”46 It is beyond dispute that 
the Board was not a court, but an agency that reviewed de novo 
the determinations of another agency. As the Supreme Court 
explained, “The Board of Tax Appeals is not a court. It is an ex-
ecutive or administrative board, upon the decision of which the 
parties are given an opportunity to base a petition for review to 
the courts after the administrative inquiry of the Board has 
been had and decided.”47 
The years following the Board’s establishment saw unsuc-
cessful attempts to transform the body from an agency to a 
court.48 In 1942, Congress changed the name of the Board to 
 
 42. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 900, 43 Stat. 253, 336–38.  
 43. Id.; accord Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 497 (1943); see also Har-
old Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Analysis—Part II: 
Creation of the Board of Tax Appeals, 40 ALB. L. REV. 7, 53–58 (1976), reprint-
ed in DUBROFF, supra note 41, at 47–52; Fahey, supra note 32, at 617. 
 44. Fahey, supra note 32, at 617. 
 45. Phillips v. Comm’r, 283 U.S. 589, 598 (1931) (citing Revenue Act of 
1928, ch. 852, § 601, 45 Stat. 791, 872); accord Dubroff, supra note 43, at 96, 
101, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 41, at 90, 95–96 (explaining that the 
Revenue Act of 1924 allowed the Board to establish its own set of evidentiary 
rules; however, it decided to use common law rules of evidence). 
 46. Revenue Act of 1924, Pub. L. No. 68-176, § 900(g), 43 Stat. 253, 337.  
 47. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Comm’r, 279 U.S. 716, 725 (1929).  
 48. See Harold Dubroff, The United States Tax Court: An Historical Anal-
ysis, Part III: The Revenue Act of 1926—Improving the Board of Tax Appeals, 
40 ALB. L. REV. 253, 257–60 (1976), reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 41, at 
113–16. To be sure, Congress tinkered with the Board’s functions. For in-
stance, the Revenue Act of 1926 provided for direct appellate review. Revenue 
Act of 1926, ch. 27, § 1001, 44 Stat. 9, 109; see also David F. Shores, Deferen-
tial Review of Tax Court Decisions: Dobson Revisited, 49 TAX LAW. 629, 635 
(1996) (discussing the incongruity of having “collateral review of a specialized 
tribunal’s decisions by a court of general jurisdiction” that could not hand 
down final decisions). Litigants no longer had to appear in both the Board and 
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“The Tax Court of the United States.”49 During the congres-
sional hearings, the Board’s chair, John Murdoch, argued that 
the Board should be renamed to reduce confusion about its role 
and highlight the formality of its proceedings.50 With the pas-
sage of the Revenue Act of 1942, the Tax Court assumed its 
new name, and its members were designated “judges.”51 Despite 
these changes, however, the Tax Court remained “an independ-
ent agency in the executive branch,” and its “jurisdiction, pow-
ers, and duties” were unchanged.52 And the Supreme Court re-
affirmed the Tax Court’s status as a federal agency—indeed, a 
special agency from which “no administrative decisions are en-
titled to higher credit in the courts.”53 
In 1946, four years after the Tax Court’s name change, 
Congress enacted the APA.54 As discussed in Part II.A, the APA 
established the default rules for the modern administrative 
 
the district court; direct review eliminated the duplication of trials inherent in 
the 1924 statute. See Deborah A. Geier, The Emasculated Role of Judicial 
Precedent in the Tax Court and Internal Revenue Service, 39 OKLA. L. REV. 
427, 431 (1986). The 1926 law also granted finality to Board decisions that 
were not appealed within six months. See Gary W. Carter, The Commissioner’s 
Nonacquiescence: A Case for a National Court of Tax Appeals, 59 TEMP. L.Q. 
879, 882 (1986) (detailing how the window for appeal was eventually short-
ened to three months in 1932 and currently sits at 90 days today).  
 49. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 798.  
 50. Dubroff, supra note 32, at 14, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 41, at 
178. Professor Fahey quips that this change allowed the Board to more easily 
reserve rooms for its hearings, since many courthouses were “reluctant to 
permit administrative hearings to be carried on in their facilities since such 
hearings were generally informal ones ‘to which large and undesirable crowds 
[were] attracted’ and at which ‘smoking’ was permitted.” Fahey, supra note 32, 
at 629 (quoting DUBROFF, supra note 41, at 178). The history behind the name 
change may be far richer than this account. Around this time the government 
began collecting larger sums of money from affluent people to fund World War 
II, see JAMES T. SPARROW, WARFARE STATE: WORLD WAR II AMERICANS AND 
THE AGE OF BIG GOVERNMENT 125 (2011), and thus it may have wanted the 
body reviewing tax determinations to look and act more like an impartial court 
than another federal agency. 
 51. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 504(a), 56 Stat. 798, 957; 
see also Diane L. Fahey, The Tax Court’s Jurisdiction over Due Process Collec-
tion Appeals: Is It Constitutional?, 55 BAYLOR L. REV. 453, 481–82 (2003).  
 52. Revenue Act of 1942, Pub. L. No. 77-753, § 504(b), 56 Stat. 798, 957; 
Fahey, supra note 51, at 482.  
 53. Dobson v. Comm’r, 320 U.S. 489, 499 (1943); see also Wilson v. 
Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 998 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (noting that 
“the constitutional status of the [1942] Tax Court was not in question” and 
that the Dobson “Court continued to treat the court as an independent execu-
tive agency, whose expertise was unquestioned”). 
 54. Administrative Procedure Act, Pub. L. No. 79-404, 60 Stat. 237 (1946) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 5 U.S.C.). 
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state, both as to the procedures agencies use in their rulemak-
ing and adjudicative activities and as to the standards courts 
use when reviewing agency action. But where did the Tax 
Court fit in this modern administrative state? After all, it was 
still an administrative agency under the Revenue Act of 1942, 
yet its name suggested it was a court. So was it subject to ei-
ther the APA procedures governing agencies or those governing 
judicial review of agency action (or neither)?  
The answer, as of 1946, was not crystal clear. As to the 
former, an opinion of the Attorney General, which was incorpo-
rated into the legislative history of the APA, advised Congress 
that “‘Courts’ includes The Tax Court, Court of Customs and 
Patent Appeals, the Court of Claims, and similar courts. This 
act does not apply to their procedure nor affect the requirement 
of resort thereto.”55 As Professor Fahey notes, “Congress was 
concerned that these judicial entities not be deemed agencies 
under the sections of the APA specifying agency adjudicatory 
procedures because these entities already had procedures in 
place.”56 
The APA’s legislative history provides further support for 
the Attorney General’s opinion that the Tax Court is a court (as 
opposed to an agency) under the APA. Section 706(2) of the 
APA provides that a court may find an agency action unlawful 
in a variety of cases, one of which (§ 706(2)(F)) is an action that 
is “unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are 
subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”57 The House 
Judiciary Committee Report cites income tax redeterminations 
as one such instance which “may involve a trial of the facts in 
The Tax Court or the United States district courts.”58 In other 
words, as Professor Fahey concludes, “the Tax Court of the 
United States [was] not exempt from the APA [judicial review 
 
 55. S. REP. NO. 79-752, at App. B (1945) (Appendix to Att’y Gen. State-
ment Regarding Revise Comm. Print of Oct. 5 1945), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 
79-248, at 224 (1946) (Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure 
Act). 
 56. Fahey, supra note 32, at 634. 
 57. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2012). 
 58. H. REP. NO. 79-1980, pt. 4 § 10(E) (1946) (report of the House Judici-
ary Committee), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 279 (1946) (Legislative 
History of the Administrative Procedure Act); see also S. REP. NO. 79-752, pt. 4 
§ 10(e) (1945) (report of the Senate Judiciary Committee), reprinted in S. Doc. 
No. 79-248, at 214 (1946) (Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure 
Act). 
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provisions] but, rather, was used as an example of how 
[§ 706(2)(F)] of the APA was intended to operate.”59 
Questions regarding the Tax Court’s status as an agency or 
court should have been put to rest in 1969. Over two decades 
after the APA’s enactment, Congress “established, under article 
I of the Constitution of the United States, a court of record to 
be known as the United States Tax Court.”60 As Judge Bybee 
has noted, “[t]his time, the Tax Court’s constitutional status did 
change.”61 In Freytag v. Commissioner, for instance, the Su-
preme Court held that the post-1969 “Tax Court exercises judi-
cial power to the exclusion of any other function. . . . The Tax 
Court’s function and role in the federal judicial scheme closely 
resemble those of the federal district courts, which indisputably 
are ‘Courts of Law.’”62  
Accordingly, since the Tax Reform Act of 1969, the Tax 
Court is no longer a federal agency but an Article I court as a 
matter of constitutional and administrative law. 
B. EXPANDING JURISDICTION 
Whereas the Tax Court’s shifting constitutional and ad-
ministrative law status has been well chronicled, its expanding 
jurisdiction has been often overlooked yet sheds important light 
 
 59. Fahey, supra note 32, at 636; see id. at 634–36 (exploring legislative 
history in more detail). But see O’Dwyer v. Comm’r, 266 F.2d 575, 580 (4th Cir. 
1959) (holding that the Tax Court is not subject to the APA, because it was not 
a “reviewing court” under the APA). In her terrific response to this Article, 
Leandra Lederman explores in greater detail what Congress meant by 
“court[s] of the United States” and reviewing “court” under the APA, conclud-
ing that the evidence is mixed on the status of the Tax Court at the time the 
APA was enacted. See Leandra Lederman, Restructuring the U.S. Tax Court: 
A Reply to Stephanie Hoffer and Christopher Walker’s The Death of Tax Court 
Exceptionalism, 99 MINN. L. REV. HEADNOTES 20–24 (2014), http://www 
.minnesotalawreview.org/headnotes. 
 60. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, sec. 951, § 7441, 83 Stat. 
487, 730 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 7441 (2012)); see also Dubroff, supra note 32, 
at 40–51, reprinted in DUBROFF, supra note 41, at 204–15. 
 61. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 998 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dis-
senting). 
 62. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 891 (1991); see id. (“The courts of 
appeals, moreover, review those decisions ‘in the same manner and to the 
same extent as decisions of the district courts in civil actions tried without a 
jury.’ [26 U.S.C.] § 7482(a). This standard of review contrasts with the stand-
ard applied to agency rulemaking by the courts of appeals under § 10(e) of the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).”); see also Lederman, 
(Un)Appealing Deference, supra note 14, at 1874–93 (detailing why as a mat-
ter of law and policy the appellate model of judicial review that applies to judi-
cial review of other trial court decisions should apply to Tax Court decisions). 
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on whether the Tax Court is governed by the APA’s judicial re-
view provisions. Despite its transformation, at the passage of 
both the APA in 1946 and the Tax Reform Act in 1969, the Tax 
Court’s jurisdiction remained limited to redetermination of in-
come tax deficiencies.63 IRS deficiency determinations have 
been, and continue to be, subject to de novo scope and standard 
of review in the Tax Court and other federal courts.64 
Congress did not expand the Tax Court’s reach until the 
1970s, after the Tax Court had officially become a court in 1969 
and more than three decades after the APA’s enactment.65 The 
court’s broadened reach included both new subject matters and 
new forms of relief. With the passage of the Employee Retire-
ment Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), the Tax Court was 
given the power to issue declaratory judgments about qualifica-
tion of retirement plans for preferential federal treatment.66 
The Tax Reform Act of 1976 enabled the court to issue declara-
tory judgments in taxpayer challenges to refusal of tax-exempt 
organizational status.67 It also allowed the court to review IRS 
refusals to abate interest in tax collection cases.68 In addition, 
the court received the power to subpoena, on a taxpayer’s be-
half, certain evidence in collection cases and to order the 
Treasury Department to release the identity of persons to 
whom written rulings pertain.69 Later legislation expanded the 
court’s jurisdiction to include review of taxpayer challenges to 
an even wider variety of agency actions, including adjustments 
to partnership tax returns, collection actions including lien and 
levy of taxpayer and third-party assets, employment status de-
terminations, and innocent spouse relief determinations.70 Con-
 
 63. See Danshera Cords, Administrative Law and Judicial Review of Tax 
Collection Decisions, 52 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 429, 435–36 (2008). 
 64. Id. at 436, 456–57.  
 65. See Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, 90 Stat. 1520 (codi-
fied as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.). 
 66. Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-
406, title II, pt. 4, sec. 1041, § 7476, 88 Stat. 829, 949 (codified as amended at 
26 U.S.C. § 7476). 
 67. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, title XIII, sec. 1306, § 
7428, 90 Stat. 1520, 1717 (codified as amended at 26 U.S.C. § 7428). 
 68. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, title XII, sec. 1212, § 
6404, 90 Stat. 1520, 1712 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6404). 
 69. Tax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, title XII, sec. 1201, § 
6110(d)(3), 90 Stat. 1520, 1661 (codified at 26 U.S.C. § 6902 (subpoena power), 
§ 6110(d)(3)) (order to release identity of taxpayers to whom written rulings 
are directed).  
 70. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 6015 (innocent spouse claims), 6226 (partnership pro-
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gress’s conception of the court’s role clearly is not constrained 
by its prior existence as an agency of limited mission. Rather, 
the modern court’s jurisdiction requires it to decide whether the 
IRS has permissibly exercised its discretion in a variety of con-
texts.71  
Three kinds of cases are useful when comparing the court’s 
legacy agency role to its modern judicial role: redetermination 
of income tax deficiencies, review of collection due process de-
terminations, and review of innocent spouse relief determina-
tions. The following describes these three in greater detail. We 
return to these examples in Part II.B to illustrate the appropri-
ate approach for the Tax Court to determine its standard and 
scope of review under the APA. 
1. Tax Deficiency 
The Tax Court’s power to redetermine tax liability pre-
dates the APA.72 Under modern law, § 6213 permits a taxpayer 
to petition the Tax Court for redetermination of the IRS’s defi-
ciency determination.73 In simple terms, a “deficiency” is the 
amount by which the taxpayer’s legal liability exceeds the 
amount of liability reported on that taxpayer’s return.74 The 
IRS may determine a deficiency for only certain kinds of taxes, 
including income, estate, and gift taxes, and certain excise tax-
es levied against private foundations.75 The IRS’s deficiency de-
termination generally follows an audit either conducted purely 
through correspondence, at the local IRS office, or, for more 
complicated matters, at the location of the taxpayer’s records.76  
 
ceedings), 6228(a) (review of disallowed request for adjustment by tax matters 
partner), 6234 (declaratory judgment regarding treatment on non-partnership 
items on over-sheltered return), 6246(b) (power to enjoin premature levy), 
6247 (review of adjustment to partnership return), 6252 (review of denial of 
request for administrative adjustment), 6330 (collection due process claims), 
7429(b) (review of jeopardy assessment), 7436 (determination of employment 
status), 7479 (declaratory judgment of eligibility of estate to make installment 
payments), 7623 (review of award to whistleblower). This list is non-
exhaustive. 
 71. The Tax Court’s jurisdiction is not exclusive, and taxpayers have a 
choice of forum in many cases. See Cords, supra note 63, at 437.  
 72. Fahey, supra note 32, at 619 (describing the Tax Court’s ability to re-
view tax liability from the time it was created in the form of the Board of Tax 
Appeals in 1924). 
 73. 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a). 
 74. Id. § 6211(a).  
 75. Id. § 6211(a). Deficiency procedures also apply to penalties calculated 
as a percentage of those named taxes. Id. § 6665(a) (2012). 
 76. See DAVID M. RICHARDSON ET AL., CIVIL TAX PROCEDURE 87–88 (2005) 
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The audit may take a few hours or several months.77 During 
this time, the IRS may request information from the taxpayer 
informally or via summons, and it may interview knowledgea-
ble third parties.78  
Following an audit in which the IRS discovers a deficiency, 
the IRS typically will issue a preliminary report proposing ad-
justments to the taxpayer’s liability.79 The taxpayer has thirty 
days following the issuance date to request reconsideration by 
the IRS Office of Appeals.80 Appeals conferences are conducted 
informally, often remotely and occasionally in person.81 Alt-
hough the taxpayer may elect to record an appeals conference, 
testimony is not given under oath, rules of evidence do not ap-
ply, and no transcripts are made of the proceedings.82  
When a case is not resolved on administrative appeal, the 
IRS will mail a statutorily required notice of deficiency to the 
taxpayer.83 The taxpayer then has ninety days to file a petition 
for redetermination with the Tax Court.84 In court, the IRS’s 
determination of deficiency is given a “presumption of correct-
ness, and the taxpayer bears the burden of proving that the de-
termination is wrong.”85 The parties are required to stipulate to 
agreed-upon facts, so admission of evidence is limited to those 
facts which are in dispute.86 By statute, if a taxpayer is able to 
produce “in any court proceeding . . . credible evidence with re-
spect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining the liability 
 
(describing audit procedures). The IRS conducts audit proceedings by 26 
U.S.C. § 6201(a), which provides for “inquiries, determinations, and assess-
ments of all taxes,” and by § 7602(a)(1), which allows the IRS to “examine any 
books, papers, records, or other data which may be relevant” to a determina-
tion of the accuracy of the taxpayer’s return. 
 77. See RICHARDSON, supra note 76, at 87–88. 
 78. See 26 U.S.C. §§ 7602(a) (describing the summons power), 7602(c) (re-
quiring IRS to notify taxpayer that it has contacted third parties). 
 79. See 26 C.F.R. § 601.105(d)(1) (2013). 
 80. See LEANDRA LEDERMAN & STEPHEN W. MAZZA, TAX CONTROVERSIES: 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 5.02[B][2], [C][2] (3d ed. 2009). 
 81. Id. § 5.02[C][5] (explaining that, although appeals conferences were 
traditionally conducted in person, they may now be done remotely or through 
correspondence). 
 82. See RICHARDSON ET AL., supra note 76, at 111–12 (describing infor-
mality of appeals process). 
 83. See 26 U.S.C. § 6212(a) (IRS must notify taxpayer of determination 
and provide contact information for local office of the taxpayer advocate). 
 84. See id. § 6213(a) (taxpayer has 90 days from date of mailing, or 150 
days if the taxpayer is outside of the country, to file petition with Tax Court). 
 85. Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115 (1933). 
 86. See TAX CT. R. 91 (requirement for stipulation).  
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of the taxpayer,” the burden of proof for that issue shifts to the 
IRS.87 Such burden-shifting only occurs if, among other things, 
“the taxpayer has maintained all records required under this 
title and has cooperated with reasonable requests by the Secre-
tary for witnesses, information, documents, meetings, and in-
terviews.”88 
2. Innocent Spouse  
Section 6015 of the Internal Revenue Code provides relief 
from joint and several liability.89 Typically, married couples 
who file a joint income tax return are equally liable for the 
amount of tax owed for the year in which the return is filed.90 
As with any taxpayer, there are two instances in which a cou-
ple may owe money to the government after the date of filing. 
First, a couple may have correctly computed its tax liability but 
may not have paid the amount owed. This is referred to as an 
underpayment.91 Second, a couple may have incorrectly com-
puted its tax, reporting an amount due that is less than its ac-
tual liability. This is referred to as an understatement.92 Be-
cause the spouses are jointly and severally liable, the IRS may 
collect the shortfall from either spouse regardless of who was 
responsible for the underpayment or understatement.93 
Section 6015 provides relief to a spouse who was not re-
sponsible for the underpayment or understatement in three de-
fined circumstances.94 First, under § 6015(b), the IRS must find 
that both objective and subjective criteria have been satisfied.95 
For instance, to receive relief from an understatement, an inno-
cent spouse must show that she had no reason to know of the 
understatement and that “taking into account all facts and cir-
cumstances, it is inequitable to hold [the innocent spouse] lia-
ble for the deficiency . . . .”96 A second form of relief, found in 
 
 87. 26 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(1).  
 88. Id. § 7491(a)(2)(B).     
 89. Id. § 6015. 
 90. Id. § 6013(d)(3). 
 91. See id. § 6601. 
 92. See id. § 6662(d)(2). 
 93. Id. § 6013(d)(3). 
 94. Id. § 6015. The claim may be raised on its own or in conjunction with 
deficiency or collection due process proceedings. 
 95. See id. § 6015(b). 
 96. Id. § 6015(b)(1). Relief is available if the couple has filed a joint return 
on which there is an understatement of tax arising from tax items attributable 
to one spouse; the other did not know or have reason to know of the under-
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§ 6015(c), allows an innocent spouse to request allocation of the 
liability as though the couple had filed separate returns.97 This 
form of relief is only available if the couple has separated.98 
Although it must balance equity in the first form of relief, the 
IRS is granted discretion in neither case. If a taxpayer meets 
the statutory requirements, the IRS is required to grant relief.99 
A third form of innocent spouse relief—equitable relief—
differs markedly. Under § 6015(f), “the Secretary may relieve” 
an innocent spouse of joint and several liability if two criteria 
are met.100 First, “taking into account all the facts and circum-
stances, it is inequitable to hold the individual liable.”101 Se-
cond, relief is not available through the other two circumstanc-
es.102 Equitable relief is available in cases of deficiency arising 
from understatement and also in cases of underpayment.103 
Although the “facts and circumstances” language of 
§ 6015(f) mirrors that of § 6015(b), there is an important differ-
ence. The IRS “may” grant relief in an equitable claim under 
§ 6015(f) but “shall” grant relief under § 6015(b). The difference 
in language leaves little doubt that Congress intended to grant 
discretion to the IRS in equitable innocent spouse claims. The 
textual difference between “shall” and “may” is stark, and the 
difference in language between the two is even more meaning-
ful because § 6015(b) and § 6015(f) were enacted in a single 
piece of legislation.104 Moreover, relief under subsections (b) or 
(c) is given to any qualifying taxpayer who elects it. Relief un-
der subsection (f) is available only if the IRS accedes to the tax-
payer’s request.105 The statute’s language makes it clear that 
 
statement; and taking into account facts and circumstances, it is inequitable 
to hold that spouse liable for the deficiency. Id.  
 97. Id. § 6015(c)–(d). 
 98. Id. § 6015(c)(3)(A). 
 99. Id. § 6015(b)(1), (c)(1). 
 100. Id. § 6015(f). 
 101. Id. § 6015(f)(1). 
 102. Id. § 6015(f)(2). 
 103. See id. § 6015(f)(1). 
 104. See Internal Revenue Service Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 
(RRA), Pub. L. No. 105-206, 112 Stat. 685, 734 (codified as amended at 26 
U.S.C. § 6015). The discrepancy in the role of the IRS in these claims is made 
even clearer by the portion of § 6015 that provides that Tax Court review is 
available to an individual “who elects to have subsection (b) or (c) apply, or in 
the case of an individual who requests equitable relief under subsection (f).” 26 
U.S.C. § 6015(e)(1). 
 105. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f). The use of the language is not isolated. It reap-
pears in a provision allowing an innocent spouse to file a Tax Court petition “6 
months after the date such election is filed or request is made with the Secre-
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the IRS exercises discretion when deciding whether to grant re-
lief under § 6015(f).  
Innocent spouse claims may arise in three contexts: defi-
ciency proceedings, collection due process claims, and inde-
pendent claims referred to as standalone claims.106 In general, 
claims raised in any of these three contexts are processed 
through a central servicing center.107 Although the IRS may re-
quest additional written information from a taxpayer, there 
typically is no administrative hearing in an innocent spouse 
case.108 The IRS is required to give notice of the claim to the 
non-requesting spouse, and that person may choose to submit 
information relevant to the case.109 Upon completion of its re-
view, the IRS sends a letter of determination to the requesting 
 
tary. . . .” Id. § 6015(e)(1)(A)(ii). 
 106. See King v. Comm’r., 115 T.C. 118, 121–23 (2000) (describing bases for 
Tax Court jurisdiction over § 6015 claims).  
 107. In the deficiency context, see I.R.S. Notice CC-2013-011 (June 17, 
2013), which states that when a taxpayer raises § 6015 for the first time in a 
Tax Court petition challenging a determination of deficiency, “[i]f the Service 
has not made a determination regarding a petitioner’s entitlement to section 
6015 relief before the petitioner filed a [Tax Court] petition, the trial attorney 
must request a determination from the Cincinnati Centralized Innocent 
Spouse Operations (CCISO) unit.” See also I.R.S. IRM 4.19.13.22 (Jan. 1, 
2014) (stating that if a § 6015 claim is raised during a taxpayer examination, 
the IRS will refer the claim to CCISO); I.R.S. IRM 4.8.9.16.10.6 (June 9, 2013) 
(clarifying that in deficiency proceedings, if a taxpayer files a Tax Court peti-
tion raising § 6015 before the § 6015 claim has been resolved by the agency, 
counsel may return the issue to either the original examiner or to CCISO for 
consideration); I.R.S. IRM 25.15.12.25 (May 22, 2012) (stating that if a § 6015 
claim is raised for the first time in a Tax Court petition, counsel will refer the 
case to CCISO for consideration). In the standalone context, see I.R.S. IRM 
25.15.1.6.1 (July 30, 2014), which states that stand-alone § 6015 claims must 
be routed for central processing. In the collection due process context, see 
I.R.S. IRM 8.22.8.9 (Nov. 8, 2013), which states that a taxpayer who raises a 
§ 6015 claim during CDP proceeding must file Form 8857 to be processed by 
CCISO. 
 108. See generally 26 U.S.C. § 6015. A taxpayer may file a claim using 
Form 8857, and the IRS typically uses Form 12510 to request additional in-
formation. 
 109. Treas. Reg. § 1.6015-6(b) (2002). This information may include the le-
gal status of the marriage, the extent of the innocent spouse’s knowledge of 
errors on the return or underpayment, the extent of the innocent spouse’s 
knowledge of family finances, level of education, benefit to the innocent 
spouse, asset transfers between the spouses, evidence of fraud by either 
spouse, allocation of tax items between the spouses, whether it would be ineq-
uitable to hold the innocent spouse liable, and any other relevant information. 
Id. 
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spouse, who may appeal the decision within the agency and/or 
to the Tax Court if he or she has not already done so.110 
All innocent spouse claims are subject to judicial review 
under § 6015(e), which grants jurisdiction to the Tax Court “to 
determine the appropriate relief available to the individual un-
der this section . . . .”111 The statute permits a non-claimant 
spouse to join the suit as well.112 An innocent spouse may peti-
tion the Tax Court on the earlier of two dates: either the date 
on which the IRS mails its final determination of the claim, or 
six months after the claim is filed with the IRS.113 In the latter 
case, the IRS has not yet rendered a decision when the taxpay-
er’s petition is presented to the court. The IRS’s collection ac-
tion is suspended by statute until either the taxpayer fails to 
file a timely petition with the court or “the decision of the Tax 
Court has become final.”114 District courts may also review in-
nocent spouse claims on occasion, if the claim is raised in the 
context of a refund suit.115  
3. Collection Due Process 
The review of collection due process complaints is a third 
important example of Tax Court jurisdiction. Under §§ 6320 
and 6330, taxpayers are entitled to administrative review when 
the IRS gives public notice of lien on taxpayer property or when 
it notifies a taxpayer of its plan to seize property through 
levy.116 Because the two review procedures are similar and may 
be combined in a single hearing, we focus on administrative re-
view of proposed levies.117 Upon notification that the IRS has 
filed a Notice of Federal Tax Lien, or upon notice of the IRS’s 
intent to levy, a taxpayer may request a hearing with an “im-
 
 110. See 26 U.S.C. § 6015(e) (establishing the Tax Court’s jurisdiction). 
 111. Id. § 6015(e)(1). 
 112. Id. § 6015(e)(4). 
 113. Id. § 6015(e)(1)(A). Note the formality of the process: the IRS is re-
quired by statute to use either certified or registered mail. Id. 
§ 6015(e)(1)(A)(i)(I). 
 114. Id. § 6015(e)(1)(B)(i). 
 115. Id. § 6015(e)(3). 
 116. Id. §§ 6320 (taxpayer entitled to notice and opportunity for hearing 
upon IRS’s filing of notice if lien), 6330 (same for levy). See generally Stepha-
nie Hoffer et al., To Pay or Delay: The Nominee’s Dilemma Under Collection 
Due Process, 82 TUL. L. REV. 781, 787–94 (2008) (examining the collection due 
process provisions and their history). 
 117. See 26 U.S.C. § 6320(b)(4) (providing that “[t]o the extent practicable, 
a hearing under this section shall be held in conjunction with a hearing under 
section 6330”). 
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partial officer” from the IRS Office of Appeals.118 Issues that a 
taxpayer may raise in the hearing include spousal defenses, 
challenges to the appropriateness of collection actions, and pro-
posals for alternative methods of collection.119  
Per IRS regulations, collection due process hearings are 
not subject to the formal hearing requirements of the APA and 
may be conducted in person.120 They need “not be a single event, 
but may instead be a series of telephonic or written corre-
spondence taking place over time.”121 The applicable regulations 
suggest that a face-to-face meeting ordinarily will be offered to 
requesting taxpayers whose argument is not frivolous.122 The 
IRS is not required to create a transcript or recording of the 
hearing, and the taxpayer has no right to subpoena or examine 
witnesses.123 Overall, the proceedings are informal.124 When the 
hearing is complete, the IRS sends the taxpayer its determina-
tion.125 
A taxpayer who is unsatisfied with the IRS’s determination 
may appeal the case to the Tax Court.126 The IRS Office of Ap-
peals retains jurisdiction over the case and may consider how a 
change in the taxpayer’s circumstances affects its original de-
termination.127 Notwithstanding the retention of agency juris-
diction, the statute expressly states that “the Tax Court shall 
have jurisdiction with respect to such matter.”128 
* * * 
In sum, collection due process claims and innocent spouse 
claims both are representative of the Tax Court’s expanding ju-
risdiction. Although the court, like its historical predecessor—
 
 118. Id. § 6320(b)(3). 
 119. Id. § 6330(c)(2)(A). Methods of alternative collection may include post-
ing bond, substituting other assets, or entering into a contractual agreement 
such as installment agreement or an offer-in-compromise. Id. 
§ 6330(c)(2)(A)(iii). 
 120. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d), Q&A (6) (as amended in 2006). 
 121. Bryan T. Camp, The Failure of Adversarial Process in the Administra-
tive State, 84 IND. L.J. 57, 83 (2009). 
 122. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d), Q&A (7) (as amended in 2006).  
 123. Id. § 301.6330-1(d), Q&A (6). 
 124. For a thorough treatment of this point, see Camp, supra note 121, at 
80–88. Professor Camp explains that “hearings can sometimes be so informal 
that a taxpayer may not understand that one took place until receiving the 
Notice of Determination.” Id. at 84. 
 125. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(e)(3), Q&A (8)(E) (as amended in 2006). 
 126. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1) (2012). 
 127. Id. § 6330(d)(2). 
 128. Id. § 6330(d)(1). 
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the Board of Tax Appeals—was initially limited to the determi-
nation of deficiencies, its role has grown over time to encom-
pass the review of equitable determinations and exercises of 
agency discretion.129 This increased jurisdictional breadth pro-
vides further support for the conclusion that Congress views 
the Tax Court as a true court to which it has granted power to 
review agency determinations. In this sense, it is no different 
from other federal courts that regularly apply the APA when 
reviewing the determinations of federal agencies (including the 
IRS). Part II expands on this point by presenting the legal case 
against Tax Court exceptionalism.  
II. THE LEGAL CASE AGAINST TAX COURT 
EXCEPTIONALISM   
The Tax Court has declared in unambiguous terms that 
“[t]he APA has never governed proceedings in the Court (or in 
the Board of Tax Appeals).”130 Federal courts of appeals, by con-
trast, are divided on whether the Tax Court is bound by the 
APA’s judicial review provisions.131 And even the Tax Court has 
reached conflicting conclusions in certain contexts.132 
To resolve this confusion, we return to principles of admin-
istrative law to conclude that the Tax Court, when reviewing 
federal agency actions, is bound by the APA—just like every 
other federal court.133 Part II.A provides the basics of judicial 
 
 129. See id. §§ 6015, 6330 (describing the merits of innocent spouse and 
collection due process claims and granting jurisdiction to the Tax Court to re-
view IRS determinations of these claims). 
 130. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 96 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th 
Cir. 2006); see also Porter v. Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 117 (2008) (“Since its en-
actment in 1946 the APA has generally not governed proceedings in this Court 
(or in its predecessor, the Board of Tax Appeals).”). 
 131. See Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 994–996 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, 
J., dissenting) (reviewing different circuit court perspectives on the relation-
ship between the Tax Court and the APA).  
 132. Indeed, as Professor Cords observes, “despite its statements pertain-
ing to the inapplicability of the APA in cases before it, the Tax Court recogniz-
es the application of the APA in some, but not all, non-collection circumstanc-
es.” Cords, supra note 63, at 457 & n.187 (citing Mailman v. Comm’r, 91 T.C. 
1079, 1082–83 (1988); Estate of Gardner v. Comm’r, 82 T.C. 989, 994 (1984); 
Dittler Bros., Inc. v. Comm’r, 72 T.C. 896, 909–10 (1979), aff’d without pub-
lished opinion, 642 F.2d 1211 (5th Cir. 1981)). 
 133. We are by no means the first to suggest that the Tax Court apply the 
APA judicial review provisions. See Wilson. 705 F.3d at 994–1012 (9th Cir. 
2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting); Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1278–87 (11th 
Cir. 2009) (Tjoflat, J., dissenting); Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 458–62 
(8th Cir. 2006) (Colloton, J.); Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 56–71 (2004) 
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review of agency action under the APA. Part II.B then applies 
those principles to the Tax Court, focusing on the three types of 
claims discussed in Part I.B as well as the Tax Court’s peculiar 
conclusion that it has no power to remand most matters to the 
agency. 
A. JUDICIAL REVIEW UNDER THE APA 
The APA establishes the default standards for judicial re-
view of federal agency rulemaking, adjudication, and other 
forms of agency action.134 For the purposes of the APA, “agency” 
is defined to include “each authority of the Government of the 
United States, whether or not it is within or subject to review 
by another agency, but does not include” Congress, certain mili-
tary authorities, the government of the District of Columbia 
and other U.S. territories, and, as particularly relevant here, 
“the courts of the United States.”135 The APA judicial review 
standards apply to any “reviewing court” of agency action,136 as 
opposed, for instance, to an administrative appeals board with-
in an agency. 
The APA judicial review standards apply when Congress 
has made a particular agency action “reviewable by statute” or 
the action is a “final agency action for which there is no other 
adequate remedy in a court.”137 As the APA further details, only 
an individual “aggrieved” by the agency action is entitled to ju-
dicial review,138 and “[t]he form of the proceeding for judicial re-
view is the special statutory review proceeding relevant to the 
subject matter in a court specified by statute or, in the absence 
or inadequacy thereof . . . , in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion.”139  
 
(Halpern & Holmes, JJ., dissenting), rev’d on jurisdictional grounds, 439 F.3d 
1009 (9th Cir. 2006); see also Cords, supra note 63, at 448–78; Fahey, supra 
note 32, at 610–48. We draw on these thoughtful positions in particular cases 
and with respect to specific claims to advance a more comprehensive argument 
that the APA applies to the Tax Court’s review of any IRS action. 
 134. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701–706 (2012).  
 135. Id. § 701(b)(1). 
 136. Id. § 706. 
 137. Id. § 704. See generally Bowen v. Massachusetts, 487 U.S. 879, 901–08 
(1988) (providing the history and interpretations of § 704). The APA expressly 
does not apply when “agency action is committed to agency discretion by law.” 
5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2). 
 138. 5 U.S.C. § 702 (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency ac-
tion, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of 
a relevant statute, is entitled to judicial review thereof.”). 
 139. Id. § 703. 
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The statute that authorizes an agency’s action—which is 
commonly referred to as an agency’s organic or governing stat-
ute—is thus the primary source of judicial review instructions. 
As Judge Bybee explains, the agency’s organic statute “will fre-
quently identify the reviewing court, confer jurisdiction, pro-
vide venue, and waive sovereign immunity; although, any par-
ticular organic act may not address each of these elements.”140 
It may also specify the standard and scope of judicial review141 
or prohibit judicial review altogether.142 Oftentimes, however, 
the agency’s organic statute is silent, ambiguous, or otherwise 
inadequate in specifying the judicial review provisions. In those 
situations, the default APA provisions apply. 
Indeed, “[r]ecognizing the importance of maintaining a uni-
form approach to judicial review of administrative action,” the 
Supreme Court has instructed reviewing courts to “apply the 
APA’s court/agency review standards in the absence of an ex-
ception” set forth by Congress.143 In Dickinson v. Zurko, the 
Court explained that “[t]he APA was meant to bring uniformity 
to a field full of variation and diversity. It would frustrate that 
purpose to permit divergence on the basis of a requirement 
‘recognized’ only as ambiguous.”144 Accordingly, to depart from 
the APA default, the agency’s organic statute must suggest 
“more than a possibility of a [different] standard, and indeed 
more than even a bare preponderance of evidence”; the excep-
tion “must be clear.”145  
 
 140. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 998 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dis-
senting). 
 141. See id. (citing 30 U.S.C. § 1276). 
 142. See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (providing that the APA “applies, according to 
the provisions thereof, except to the extent that—(1) statutes preclude judicial 
review. . . .”). 
 143. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999). 
 144. Id. at 155. The Court found significant Congress’s determination in 
the APA that “[n]o subsequent legislation shall be held to supersede or modify 
the provisions of this Act except to the extent that such legislation shall do so 
expressly.” 5 U.S.C. § 559; see also Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955) 
(“Exemptions from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not 
lightly to be presumed in view of the statement in § 12 of the Act that modifi-
cations must be express . . . ”). The Dickinson Court concluded that “[a] statu-
tory intent that legislative departure from the norm must be clear suggests a 
need for similar clarity in respect to grandfathered common-law variations.” 
527 U.S. at 155. 
 145. Dickinson, 527 U.S. at 154–55; see also see also II RICHARD J. PIERCE, 
JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 11.2 at 772 (4th ed. 2002) (explaining 
that Dickinson “seemed to establish a presumption in favor of uniformity in 
standards for judicial review of agency actions that can be overcome only by 
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In sum, unless Congress has directed otherwise by statute, 
the APA’s default provisions apply to a court’s review of agency 
action. As discussed below, the APA specifies both the standard 
and the scope of review, and a variety of administrative com-
mon law rules supplement the APA standards and similarly 
apply as default rules absent an exception. 
1. Default Standard of Review 
Section 706 of the APA sets forth the standard of review by 
explaining the circumstances under which “[t]he reviewing 
court shall . . . hold unlawful and set aside agency action, find-
ings, and conclusions.”146 In particular, the court must set aside 
agency action that is “arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.”147 The APA pro-
vides two exceptions to this standard. First, § 706(2)(F) com-
mands that the reviewing court set aside agency action 
“unwarranted by the facts to the extent that the facts are sub-
ject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”148 Second, with re-
spect to formal rulemaking, formal adjudication, and other ac-
tion “on the record of an agency hearing provided by statute,” 
§ 706(2)(e) instructs that agency action “unsupported by sub-
stantial evidence” must be set aside.149 
In other words—aside from these two exceptions, both of 
which are arguably more searching of agency action and apply 
to limited types of agency action—the default APA standard of 
 
‘clear’ evidence in support of a departure.”). But see Marcello, 349 U.S. at 310 
(holding that Congress need not “employ magical passwords in order to effec-
tuate an exemption from the Administrative Procedure Act” but instead the 
court should look to the legislative history and the organic statute’s text, 
structure, and design to determine whether Congress intended to depart from 
the APA default). 
 146. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2). 
 147. Id. § 706(2)(A). The APA also requires a court to set aside agency ac-
tion when it is contrary to the Constitution or exceeds the agency’s statutory 
authority, id. § 706(2)(B), (2)(C), and when the agency fails to follow “proce-
dure required by law,” id. § 706(2)(D).  
 148. Id. § 706(2)(F).  
 149. Id. § 706(2)(E). As the Court has explained, the substantial evidence 
standard provides “a considerably more generous judicial review than the ‘ar-
bitrary and capricious’ test.” Abbott Labs., Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 143 
(1967); accord Am. Paper Inst. v. Am. Elec. Power Serv. Corp., 461 U.S. 402, 
412 n.7 (1983) (describing arbitrary-and-capricious review as “more lenient” to 
the agency than substantial evidence review). But see Small Refiner Lead 
Phase Down Task Force v. EPA, 705 F.2d 506, 520 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (explaining 
that “there may be ‘little practical difference’ between substantial evidence re-
view and arbitrary and capricious review.”). 
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review is the familiar abuse of discretion standard. This is the 
same standard used by appellate courts to review a variety of 
trial court decisions including, for example, evidentiary rul-
ings.150 As its name suggests, it is more deferential to agency 
action than de novo review. For instance, the Supreme Court 
has explained, in the context of reviewing Rule 11 sanctions in 
civil actions, that “[a] district court would necessarily abuse its 
discretion if it based its ruling on an erroneous view of the law 
or on a clearly erroneous assessment of the evidence.”151 This 
deferential standard, the Court noted, “will streamline the liti-
gation process by freeing appellate courts from the duty of re-
weighing evidence and reconsidering facts already weighed and 
considered by the district court [or, here, the agency]; it will al-
so discourage litigants from pursuing marginal appeals . . . .”152 
In the APA context, however, this review standard includes 
what is often called arbitrary and capricious review, which has 
been interpreted to include a reasoned decision-making re-
quirement. The Supreme Court has crystalized the breadth of 
arbitrary and capricious review:  
[A]n agency rule would be arbitrary and capricious if the agency has 
relied on factors which Congress has not intended it to consider, en-
tirely failed to consider an important aspect of the problem, offered an 
explanation for its decision that runs counter to the evidence before 
the agency, or is so implausible that it could not be ascribed to a dif-
ference in view or the product of agency expertise.153 
The focus is thus on whether the agency considered the 
factors set forth by Congress in the agency’s organic statute; 
whether it considered important aspects of the problem it was 
seeking to address; whether its proposed action is consistent 
with the evidence; and whether the action otherwise demon-
strates reasoned decision-making as evidenced by “the quality 
and coherence of the agency’s reasoning.”154 As the State Farm 
Court emphasized APA arbitrary and capricious review is “nar-
row and a court is not to substitute its judgment for that of the 
agency. Nevertheless, the agency must examine the relevant 
 
 150. See, e.g., Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 141 (1997). 
 151. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 405 (1990). 
 152. Id. at 404. 
 153. Motor Vehicle Mfg. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983). 
 154. James D. Cox & Benjamin J.C. Baucom, The Emperor Has No Clothes: 
Confronting the D.C. Circuit’s Usurpation of SEC Rulemaking Authority, 90 
TEX. L. REV. 1811, 1825 (2012); see also Koon v. United States, 518 U.S. 81, 
100 (1996) (“The abuse-of-discretion standard includes review to determine 
that the discretion was not guided by erroneous legal conclusions.”). 
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data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action in-
cluding a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the 
choice made.’ ”155 
2. Default Scope of Review 
Section 706 of the APA also suggests the scope of review, 
instructing that “the court shall review the whole record or 
those parts of it cited by a party.”156 As Professor Koch explains, 
“[i]t is blackletter law that, except in the rare case, review in 
federal court must be based on the record before the agency and 
hence a reviewing court may not go outside the administrative 
record.”157 The record review rule applies when judicial review 
“is performed by a court of original jurisdiction as well as by an 
appellate tribunal.”158 
Regardless of whether the agency action is rulemaking, 
formal adjudication, or some less formal agency action, the 
agency must submit an administrative record for judicial re-
view.159 The Supreme Court has held that “a formal hearing be-
fore the agency is in no way necessary to the compilation of an 
agency record,” and that “[t]he APA specifically contemplates 
judicial review on the basis of the agency record compiled in the 
course of informal agency action in which a hearing has not oc-
curred.”160 Such record should consist of “information upon 
which the agency action was based, including everything that 
was before the agency pertaining to the merits of its deci-
sion.”161  
Congress can depart from the record review rule in the 
agency’s organic statute by providing for a trial de novo, which 
the APA expressly contemplates by specifying a different 
standard of review (“unwarranted by the facts”) when “the facts 
are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing court.”162 Courts in 
 
 155. 463 U.S. at 43 (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 
U.S. 156, 168 (1962)); accord FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 
502, 513–14 (2009). 
 156. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2) (2012). 
 157. 2 CHARLES H. KOCH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND PRACTICE § 8.27[1], at 
509 (2d ed. 1997). 
 158. United States v. Carlo Bianchi & Co., 373 U.S. 709, 715 (1963). 
 159. See Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 743 (1985). 
 160. Id. at 744 (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(13), 704, 706). 
 161. 2 KOCH, supra note 157, § 8.27[3] at 511. 
 162. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F); see also Carlo Bianchi, 373 U.S. at 714–15 (“[I]n 
cases where Congress has simply provided for review, without setting forth 
the standards to be used or the procedures to be followed, this Court has held 
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rare circumstances also have allowed petitioners to supplement 
the administrative record when, for instance, “there has been a 
‘strong showing of bad faith or improper behavior’ or when the 
record is so bare that it prevents effective judicial review.”163 
Even when the record requires supplementation, however, the 
Supreme Court has counseled that the ordinary course is to 
remand to the agency—not supplement the record on judicial 
review:  
If the record before the agency does not support the agency action, if 
the agency has not considered all relevant factors, or if the reviewing 
court simply cannot evaluate the challenged agency action on the ba-
sis of the record before it, the proper course, except in rare circum-
stances, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or ex-
planation.164  
3. Administrative Common Law Doctrines 
In addition to the APA’s judicial review provisions, courts 
have developed administrative common law doctrines that ap-
ply generally to judicial review in the modern administrative 
state.165 For instance, courts incorporated “hard look” review in 
response to concerns of agency capture in the 1960s and 
1970s,166 and Chevron deference in response to the deregulation 
 
that consideration is to be confined to the administrative record and that no de 
novo proceeding may be held.”). 
 163. Theodore Roosevelt Conservation P’ship v. Salazar, 616 F.3d 497, 514 
(D.C. Cir. 2010) (quoting Commercial Drapery Contractors, Inc. v. United 
States, 133 F.3d 1, 7 (D.C. Cir. 1998)); see also Citizens to Pres. Overton Park, 
Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 420 (1971) (“The court may require the adminis-
trative officials who participated in the decision to give testimony explaining 
their action . . . . And where there are administrative findings that were made 
at the same time as the decision . . . there must be a strong showing of bad 
faith or improper behavior before such inquiry may be made.”), abrogated on 
other grounds by Califano v. Sanders, 430 U.S. 99 (1977); see also, e.g., Sw. 
Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Forest Serv., 100 F.3d 1443, 1450 (9th Cir. 
1996) (allowing extra-record materials (1) “if necessary to determine whether 
the agency has considered all relevant factors and has explained its decision,” 
(2) “when the agency has relied on documents not in the record,” (3) “when 
supplementing the record is necessary to explain technical terms or complex 
subject matter,” and (4) “when plaintiffs make a showing of agency bad faith” 
(internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 164. Fla. Power & Light, 470 U.S. at 744; see infra Part II.A.3 (further dis-
cussing the ordinary remand rule). 
 165. See, e.g., Gillian E. Metzger, Embracing Administrative Common Law, 
80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1293, 1295 (2012) (defining and defending “administra-
tive common law” as “administrative law doctrines and requirements that are 
largely judicially created, as opposed to those specified by Congress, the Presi-
dent, or individual agencies”).  
 166. See, e.g., Merrick B. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 
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movement in the 1980s.167 These doctrines are of general appli-
cation in the administrative state. Relying on its APA-focused 
decision in Dickinson, the Mayo Court recently observed, in the 
context of Chevron deference to tax regulations, that there is an 
“ ‘importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial re-
view of administrative action,’” such that the Supreme Court 
was “not inclined to carve out an approach to administrative 
review good for tax law only.”168 
Of particular importance here, administrative law has 
evolved to embrace the ordinary remand rule discussed in Part 
II.A.2: when a court concludes that an agency’s decision is er-
roneous or otherwise not supported by the record or the agen-
cy’s reasoning, the ordinary course is to remand to the agency 
for additional investigation or explanation (as opposed to the 
court deciding the issue itself).169 This ordinary remand rule 
applies not only to questions of fact but also to mixed questions 
of law and fact, policy judgments, and even certain questions of 
law.170 Indeed, the remand rule applies even if there are alter-
native grounds on which the agency’s decision could be af-
firmed (that the agency did not articulate in its ruling)—a de-
parture from “the settled rule” in the civil litigation context 
 
HARV. L. REV. 505, 525–62 (1985) (detailing the hard look doctrine’s develop-
ment); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness 
Review, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 761, 761 (2008) (“In the 1960s and 1970s, the feder-
al courts of appeals, above all the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia Circuit, developed the ‘hard look doctrine.’”). 
 167. Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins 
of the Appellate Review Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 
999 (2011). Professor Merrill argues that the record review rule and the re-
conceptualization of the record in response to the shift from agency adjudica-
tion to rulemaking are other examples of the flexibility of the appellate review 
model in administrative law. See id. at 998. One of the authors has argued 
elsewhere that many of these administrative common law doctrines emerge in 
response to the dual separation-of-powers values of Congress (Article I) and 
the President (Article II) at play in the modern administrative state. See 
Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, supra note 40 (manuscript at Part I). 
 168. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
704, 713 (2011) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)). 
 169. See, e.g., Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 517 (2009) (“When the BIA 
has not spoken on ‘a matter that statutes place primarily in agency hands,’ our 
ordinary rule is to remand to ‘giv[e] the BIA the opportunity to address the 
matter in the first instance in light of its own expertise.’ ” (quoting INS v. Ven-
tura, 537 U.S. 12, 16–17 (2002) (per curiam))). See generally III PIERCE, supra 
note 145, § 18.1.  
 170. See Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, supra note 40 (manuscript at 
Part I); see also Christopher J. Walker, How To Win the Deference Lottery, 91 
TEX. L. REV. SEE ALSO 73, 83–85 (2013).  
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that a trial court’s decision “must be affirmed if the result is 
correct ‘although the lower court relied upon a wrong ground or 
gave a wrong reason.’”171 We return to the ordinary remand 
rule and administrative common law more generally in Parts 
II.B and III. 
B. THE TAX COURT, THE IRS, AND THE APA 
In light of these first principles of administrative law, the 
Tax Court’s position that it is not governed by the APA is puz-
zling—and likely a remnant of both the Tax Court’s unique his-
tory and the accompanying misperception of tax 
exceptionalism.  
After all, the IRS is an executive agency within the Treas-
ury Department. Accordingly, it is an “agency” for purposes of 
the APA, as it is an “authority of the Government of the United 
States” that is not otherwise excluded from the APA’s definition 
of agency.172 Under the APA, an individual “aggrieved” by an 
IRS action thus “is entitled to judicial review . . . in a court of 
the United States”173 so long as the IRS action is “reviewable by 
statute” or is otherwise a “final agency action for which there is 
no other adequate remedy in a court.”174 Moreover, the Tax 
Court is no longer an administrative agency that reviews the 
actions of another administrative agency. Instead, as discussed 
in Part I.A, in 1969 Congress transformed the Tax Court into 
an “[A]rticle I . . . court of record to be known as the United 
States Tax Court.”175 For purposes of the APA, it is therefore “a 
court of the United States,”176 and, for its review of the IRS’s ac-
tions, a “reviewing court” subject to the APA’s judicial review 
provisions.177  
 
 171. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943) (quoting Helvering v. 
Gowran, 302 U.S. 238, 245 (1937)); see Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, 
supra note 40 (manuscript at Part I.A); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Small 
Things Like Reasons Are Put in a Jar: Reason and Legitimacy in the Adminis-
trative State, 70 FORDHAM L. REV. 17, 19–26 (2001) (exploring the different 
role of reasons in judicial review of lower court decisions, administrative ac-
tions, and congressional statutes). 
 172. 5 U.S.C. § 701(b)(1) (2012). 
 173. Id. § 702. 
 174. Id. § 704.  
 175. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, sec. 951, § 7441, 83 Stat. 
487, 730 (1969) (codified as 26 U.S.C. § 7441). 
 176. 5 U.S.C. § 702. 
 177. Id. § 706. 
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On at least one occasion, the Tax Court has misinterpreted 
its unique history to conclude that the APA does not apply be-
cause the Tax Court is not an “agency” under the APA.178 The 
Eighth Circuit rightly rejected that argument, noting that the 
Tax Court had “focused erroneously on the status of the review-
ing court, rather than on the status of the administrative body 
rendering the decision under review. The Internal Revenue 
Service, of course, is an agency of the government, and review 
of its decisions may be governed by the APA.”179 Precisely be-
cause the Tax Court is no longer an agency but an Article I 
court of the United States, its review of IRS actions is governed 
by the APA. 
Perhaps a stronger argument that the APA does not govern 
is that only Article III courts—not Article I courts—can be “re-
viewing courts” for purposes of the APA. After all, the Constitu-
tion vests “judicial power” in life-tenured Article III judges,180 
not term-limited Article I judges. The text of the APA, however, 
makes no distinction between Article I and Article III courts, 
and other Article I courts—including the Court of Federal 
Claims—are governed by the APA when reviewing agency ac-
tion.181 Moreover, if the Tax Court were not a “court” under the 
APA, then, by statutory definition, it would be an “agency”—a 
position that the Tax Court has correctly rejected.182  
 
 178. Nappi v. Comm’r, 58 T.C. 282, 284 (1972). 
 179. Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 461 (8th Cir. 2006); accord Cords, 
supra note 63, at 471 (“In determining whether the Tax Court ought to apply 
the rules of administrative law, a distinction needs to be drawn between ap-
plying administrative law to the Tax Court and an application of administra-
tive law by the Tax Court.”). 
 180. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The judicial power of the United States, 
shall be vested in one Supreme Court, and in such inferior courts as the Con-
gress may from time to time ordain and establish.”). 
 181. See infra Part II.B (discussing review of IRS actions in the Article I 
United States Court of Federal Claims). 
 182. In her response to this Article, Professor Lederman suggests that 
“there is no simple doctrinal answer to the question of whether the Tax Court 
is a ‘reviewing court’ or even a ‘court’ for purposes of the APA.” Lederman, su-
pra note 59, at 23. It is true, as Professor Lederman thoroughly documents in 
her response, that the answer is not clear from the legislative history of the 
APA alone or from the Tax Court’s subsequent treatment of its own status. 
But as discussed in this Part, it should have become clear as a matter of statu-
tory interpretation in 1969 when Congress transformed the Tax Court from an 
agency to an Article I court. Under the APA, the Tax Court must be either a 
court or an agency, and doctrinally no one argues that the post-1969 Tax 
Court is an agency. So it must be “a court of the United States” for purposes of 
the APA. Moreover, when the Tax Court reviews an action undertaken by the 
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In all events, in Freytag v. Commissioner, the Supreme 
Court rejected such an Article I/Article III court distinction.183 
Judges on the Tax Court are appointed for fifteen-year terms 
by the President, with the advice and consent of the Senate,184 
as required by the Appointments Clause. But Congress has 
vested the Chief Judge of the Tax Court with power to appoint 
special trial tax judges.185 The Constitution allows Congress to 
vest appointment powers of such inferior officers in one of three 
entities: “in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the 
Heads of Departments.”186 The parties in Freytag advanced two 
competing interpretations: the Government’s position that the 
Article I Tax Court is an executive department where the Chief 
Judge as Department Head has power to appoint inferior offic-
ers; or, alternatively, the taxpayer’s position that the Tax Court 
is neither an executive department nor a court and thus consti-
tutionally forbidden from appointing inferior officers.187  
The Freytag Court rejected both positions and instead held 
that the Tax Court is a “Court[] of Law” under the Appoint-
ments Clause.188 Importantly, the Court noted that “[t]he text of 
the Clause does not limit the ‘Courts of Law’ to those courts es-
tablished under Article III of the Constitution” and that “[t]he 
Tax Court exercises judicial, rather than executive, legislative, 
or administrative, power.”189 Whereas the Freytag Court was in-
terpreting the meaning of “Courts of Law” under the Constitu-
tion and not the meaning of “court of the United States” and 
“reviewing court” under the APA, the interpretative reasoning 
counsels the same result. The Tax Court is thus a court of the 
United States and a reviewing court under the APA.190 
 
IRS, which is indisputably an agency covered by the APA, the Tax Court is an 
APA “reviewing court” of that agency action. 
 183. Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 U.S. 868, 890–91 (1991). 
 184. 26 U.S.C. § 7443 (2012). 
 185. Id. § 7443A(a). 
 186. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2. 
 187. Freytag, 501 U.S. at 884. 
 188. Id. at 892. 
 189. Id. at 888, 890–91. Any concern that interpreting an Article I Tax 
Court as a court under the Appointments Clause would violate the constitu-
tional investiture of “judicial power” in an Article III court was dismissed by 
the Freytag Court. See id. at 889. The Court has repeatedly upheld the consti-
tutionality of Article I courts for resolution of civil disputes between the gov-
ernment and private citizens, see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION § 4.4 (6th ed. 2012), and most recently affirmed such a “public rights 
exception” in Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2611–12 (2011). 
 190. The D.C. Circuit recently rejected a constitutional challenge to the 
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That the APA governs the Tax Court’s review of IRS ac-
tions does not mean the standard of review is always abuse of 
discretion or the scope of review is always limited to the admin-
istrative record. Instead, as discussed above, these are the de-
fault review standards, and the inquiry becomes whether Con-
gress by statute has expressly overridden the APA default. To 
illustrate how the Tax Court should conduct its inquiry into 
whether the APA default rules apply, we return to the three 
examples discussed in Part II.B. We then conclude this Part by 
 
President’s removal power of judges on the Tax Court. To reach this conclu-
sion, the court held that the Tax Court is not an Article III (judicial branch) 
court but a court established under Article I (legislative branch) that actually 
exercises Article II (executive branch) powers when deciding cases.  
We have explained that Tax Court judges do not exercise the “judicial 
power of the United States” pursuant to Article III. We have also ex-
plained that Congress’s establishment of the Tax Court as an Article I 
legislative court did not transfer the Tax Court to the Legislative 
Branch. It follows that the Tax Court exercises its authority as part of 
the Executive Branch. 
Kuretski v. Comm’r, 755 F.3d 929, 943 (D.C. Cir. 2014). At least one commen-
tator has worried that Kuretski could open the door for the argument that 
“APA judicial review provisions simply do not apply in Tax Court proceedings.” 
Patrick J. Smith, Reflections on Kuretski v. Commissioner, TAXPROF BLOG 
(June 22, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/06/smith.html. 
Although the conclusion in Kuretski that the Tax Court “exercises its authority 
as part of the Executive Branch,” 755 F.3d at 943, may be in tension with the 
Freytag majority, it should have no bearing on the APA’s definitions of “agen-
cy” and “reviewing court.” Indeed, the reasoning in Kuretski suggests as much: 
“[W]e conclude that the Tax Court’s status as a ‘Court of Law’—and its exer-
cise of ‘judicial power’—for Appointments Clause purposes under Freytag casts 
no doubt on the constitutionality of the President’s authority to remove Tax 
Court judges.” Id. at 941–42; accord Kristin Hickman, Kuretski v. Commis-
sioner: A Fun and Fascinating Bit of Academic Folderol?, TAXPROF BLOG 
(June 23, 2014), http://taxprof.typepad.com/taxprof_blog/2014/06/hickman-
kuretski-v-commissioner-.html (“After all, if the Affordable Care Act penalty 
can be a tax for constitutional purposes and yet not a tax under § 7421(a) of 
the Internal Revenue Code (see NFIB v. Sebelius), then the Tax Court surely 
can bear varying labels for different purposes as well.”). If there were any lin-
gering doubts about the impact of Kuretski on the Tax Court’s relationship to 
the APA, the D.C. Circuit puts them to rest—albeit in dicta—near the end of 
the opinion:.  
And while we have no need to reach the issue here, Congress, in es-
tablishing those entities [the Tax Court and the Court of Appeals for 
the Armed Forces] as a ‘court’ rather than an ‘agency,’ perhaps also 
exempted them from statutes that apply solely to executive ‘agen-
cies.’”) Cf. Megibow v. Clerk of the U.S. Tax Court, No. 04–3321, 2004 
WL 1961591 at *4–6, (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 31, 2004) (holding that the Tax 
Court is a “court of the United States” and not an ”agency” under the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551(1)), aff’d, 432 F.3d 387 
(2d Cir. 2005) (per curiam). 
Kuretski, 755 F.3d at 944 
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analyzing the Tax Court’s refusal to apply the ordinary remand 
rule. 
1. Tax Deficiency Redeterminations 
With respect to tax deficiency redeterminations, there ap-
pears to be a consensus among courts—including the Tax 
Court191—that the standard and scope of review are both de no-
vo.192 Judge Bybee explains that the de novo review standard is 
in place “for largely historical reasons,” suggesting that “[t]he 
Tax Court’s historical de novo review of tax deficiencies—which 
dates to the 1920s—may have been grandfathered under the 
APA.”193 Indeed, even federal district courts and the (Article I) 
Court of Federal Claims review analogous cases de novo, as 
such claims are brought as civil actions for refund after the tax 
has been paid.194 
In the Tax Court, by contrast, the deficiency redetermina-
tion takes place before the tax has been paid—by filing a peti-
tion for redetermination within ninety days of receiving the no-
tice of deficiency from the IRS.195 It is thus a petition for review 
of agency action that should be governed by the APA. The his-
torical answer Judge Bybee proffers may well be correct. Be-
cause the Tax Court has always conducted de novo review of 
tax deficiencies and the APA is silent on overriding that histo-
ry, the de novo standard and scope of review for deficiency re-
 
 191. See Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 38 (2004) (“Under section 6213(a) 
and its predecessors, we (and earlier, the Board of Tax Appeals) have 
‘redetermined’ deficiencies de novo, not limited to the Commissioner’s admin-
istrative record, for more than 75 years.”), vacated on other grounds, 439 F.3d 
1009 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 192. See Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 1003 n.3 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, 
J., dissenting) (citing cases for the proposition that “[t]he Tax Court’s review of 
tax deficiencies has, for largely historical reasons, been held to be de novo.”); 
see also Clapp v. Comm’r, 875 F.2d 1396, 1403 (9th Cir. 1989) (“The Tax Court 
has as its purpose the redetermination of deficiencies, through a trial on the 
merits, following a taxpayer petition. It exercises de novo review.”); accord 
Raheja v. Comm’r, 725 F.2d 64, 66 (7th Cir. 1984). See generally Porter v. 
Comm’r, 130 T.C. 115, 119 (2008) (setting forth the Tax Court’s position on the 
de novo standard and its historical justification for the review standard). 
 193. Wilson, 705 F.3d at 1003 n.3 (Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 194. See 26 U.S.C. § 7422 (2012); see also Cords, supra note 63, at 456–57 
(explaining that in deficiency redeterminations and refund actions, “[b]oth the 
Tax Court and the district court conduct de novo review”); Melissa Ellen Segal, 
Who Bears the Burden of Proof in Taxpayer Suits Against the IRS?, 4 PITT. 
TAX REV. 155 (2007) (discussing burden of proof, introduction of evidence, and 
other procedural matters in refund action). 
 195. See 26 U.S.C. § 6213(a) (90 days from date of mailing, or 150 days if 
the taxpayer is outside of the country). 
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determinations may well have been grandfathered in under the 
APA. 
Even putting aside the historical argument, however, the 
IRS’s governing statute provides considerable evidence that 
Congress intended the Tax Court to depart from the APA de-
fault standards. First, as others have noted,196 the Internal 
Revenue Code instructs the Tax Court to “redetermine the cor-
rect amount of the deficiency.”197 Indeed, the taxpayer is ex-
pressly instructed, after receiving a notice of deficiency from 
the IRS, to “file a petition with the Tax Court for a redetermi-
nation of the deficiency.”198 The use of the term “redetermine” 
as opposed to “review” or “determine” takes on added signifi-
cance when, as discussed below, one considers that Congress 
used “determine” in other parts of the Internal Revenue Code 
to define the Tax Court’s judicial review function. As Judge 
Bybee notes, “[t]he use of the prefix ‘re-,’ to modify the word ‘de-
termine,’ suggests that something has been, or must be, done 
again; a definition in closer harmony with a de novo stand-
ard.”199 
To the extent these statutory features do not rise to the 
level of “clear” evidence of “statutory intent [of] legislative de-
parture from the [APA] norm,”200 subsequent congressional ac-
tion should remove any doubt. In 1998, Congress amended the 
Internal Revenue Code to clarify the burden of proof in tax liti-
gation.201 In particular, Congress provided that this burden-
shifting scheme applies “in any court proceeding” and shifts the 
burden to the IRS when “a taxpayer introduces credible evi-
dence with respect to any factual issue relevant to ascertaining 
the liability of the taxpayer for any tax imposed . . . .”202 There 
are certain limitations to this burden-shifting scheme, includ-
ing a requirement that the taxpayer “has cooperated with rea-
sonable requests by the [IRS] for witnesses, information, docu-
 
 196. See, e.g., Cords, supra note 63, at 473 (“Congress has specifically pro-
vided for de novo review of deficiency redeterminations; the Tax Court is di-
rected to ‘redetermine’ deficiencies.”). 
 197. See 26 U.S.C. § 6214(a). In total, § 6214 uses the term “redetermine” 
seven times to describe the Tax Court’s task with respect to tax deficiencies. 
 198. See id. § 6213(a).  
 199. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 1007 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dis-
senting). 
 200. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999). 
 201. See generally Segal, supra note 194, at 165–66 (discussing 1998 legis-
lation in more detail). 
 202. 26 U.S.C. § 7491(a)(1).  
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ments, meetings, and interviews.”203 In other words, this coop-
eration requirement is consistent with the policy rationales be-
hind the record review rule discussed in Part III—i.e., to en-
courage the taxpayer to submit all relevant evidence and make 
all arguments in the administrative proceeding. Although the 
taxpayer is not prohibited from introducing new evidence or ar-
gument “in any court proceeding” (before the Tax Court in a tax 
redetermination petition or in the other federal courts in a re-
fund action), Congress still punishes the taxpayer for failure to 
do so by not shifting the burden to the IRS.204 
More importantly, that Congress allows a taxpayer to “in-
troduce credible evidence” relevant to the taxpayer’s tax liabil-
ity “in any court proceeding” is strong evidence that Congress 
intended—to use the language of the APA—that “the facts [of a 
tax deficiency] are subject to trial de novo by the reviewing 
court.”205 Furthermore, Congress applies this burden-shifting 
scheme “in any court proceeding” with respect to “credible evi-
dence” relating to a tax deficiency, not just tax redetermination 
petitions or refund actions. The Tax Court is thus correct that 
it conducts a trial de novo of an IRS tax deficiency determina-
tion in any proceeding in which the IRS’s underlying tax defi-
ciency determination is challenged.  
That does not mean, as the Tax Court has asserted, it is 
“well settled” that “the APA does not apply to deficiency cases 
in this Court.”206 The APA still governs, but the alternative 
§ 706(2)(F) judicial review provisions apply: the administrative 
record does not bind the scope of review (“trial de novo”) and 
the standard of review is de novo (“unwarranted by the 
facts”).207 This reading of the Internal Revenue Code and APA is 
reinforced by the APA’s legislative history. As discussed in Part 
I.A, the House Judiciary Committee Report specifically cites in-
come tax redeterminations—describing them as “a trial of the 
facts in The Tax Court or the United States district courts”—as 
subject to § 706(2)(F).208  
 
 203. Id. § 7491(a)(2)(B).  
 204. Id. § 7491(a)(1)–(2) (describing the general rule and limitations on 
burden shifting for taxpayers who produce credible evidence).  
 205. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2012) (APA exception to record review rule and 
abuse of discretion standard). 
 206. Ewing v. Comm’r, 122 T.C. 32, 37 (2004), rev’d on jurisdictional 
grounds, 439 F.3d 1009 (9th Cir. 2006). 
 207. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F). 
 208. H. REP. NO. 79-1980, pt. 4 § 10(E) (1946) (report of the House Judici-
ary Committee), reprinted in S. DOC. NO. 79-248, at 279 (1946) (Legislative 
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2. Review of Innocent Spouse Determinations 
Unlike in the case of tax deficiency redeterminations, there 
is no consensus among courts about the proper standard and 
scope of review for innocent spouse claims. As discussed in Part 
I.B, there are three ways in which an innocent spouse may 
qualify for relief from joint and several liability for tax deficien-
cies. Here, we focus on the third avenue—equitable relief under 
§ 6015(f)—because this is where the judicial disagreement is 
sharpest. 
The Tax Court’s position on its own standard and scope of 
review for innocent spouse claims for equitable relief has shift-
ed over time. First, in 2002, the Tax Court stated that it would 
review, for abuse of discretion, the IRS’s decision not to grant 
innocent spouse equitable relief.209 Two years later a divided 
Tax Court maintained the abuse of discretion standard of re-
view but applied a de novo scope of review, concluding—
contrary to the IRS’s position in the case—that “the APA record 
rule does not apply to § 6015(f) determinations in this Court.”210 
Then, in 2009, another divided Tax Court concluded that it re-
views the IRS’s § 6015(f) decision with “a de novo standard of 
review as well as a de novo scope of review.”211  
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the federal courts of appeals have 
similarly split on which standard applies. In response to the 
Tax Court’s 2002 position, the D.C. and Fifth Circuits agreed 
that abuse of discretion is the proper standard of review for in-
 
History of the Administrative Procedure Act); see also S. REP. NO. 79-752, pt. 4 
§ 10(e) (1945) (report of the Senate Judiciary Committee), reprinted in S. DOC. 
NO. 79-248, at 214 (1946) (Legislative History of the Administrative Procedure 
Act); Fahey, supra note 32, at 634–36 (exploring legislative history in more 
detail).  
 209. Johnson v. Comm’r, 118 T.C. 106, 125 (2002), aff’d on other grounds, 
353 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir. 2003).  
 210. Ewing, 122 T.C. at 43–44, rev’d on jurisdictional grounds, 439 F.3d 
1009 (9th Cir. 2006). Judges Halpern and Holmes dissented from the majori-
ty’s conclusion that the APA default standard and scope of review and provi-
sions do not apply to the Tax Court’s review of IRS actions. See Ewing, 122 
T.C. at 56–71 (Halpen & Holmes, JJ., dissenting). Their dissent returns to 
first principles of administrative law similar to the approach set forth in Part 
II.A, concluding that “[w]e would therefore hold that the APA judicial review 
provisions apply to section 6015(f) cases as well as deficiency cases.” Id. at 61. 
 211. Porter v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 203, 206–10 (2009). Judge Gustafson, 
among others, dissented. Judge Gustafson noted that Congress empowered the 
IRS to have discretion about whether to grant equitable relief, and it would be 
bizarre to review an agency’s exercise of discretion de novo. See id. at 226–35 
(Gustafson, J., dissenting). 
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nocent spouse claims for equitable relief.212 Neither the D.C. 
Circuit nor the Fifth Circuit had occasion to consider the proper 
scope of review, as the Tax Court had not yet declared that it 
could conduct a trial de novo. 
In response to the Tax Court’s 2004 position, a divided 
Eleventh Circuit upheld the Tax Court’s position (and rejected 
the IRS’s contrary position) that the Tax Court is not bound by 
the APA’s record review rule.213 The court had no reason to 
opine on the standard of review, as the taxpayer, IRS, and Tax 
Court all agreed that abuse of discretion was the proper stand-
ard.214 Judge Tjoflat dissented, arguing that “a careful review of 
applicable law reveals that neither the plain language nor the 
legislative history nor the historical practices of the Tax 
Court . . . indicate Congress’s intent to supplant the scope and 
standard of review set forth in the Administrative Procedure 
Act.”215 
Finally, a divided Ninth Circuit upheld the Tax Court’s 
current position, holding that “the Tax Court properly consid-
ered new evidence outside the administrative record” and 
properly “applied a de novo standard of review.”216 Judge Bybee 
filed a trenchant dissent, arguing that “[b]ecause the Tax Court 
is a ‘reviewing court’ for purposes of the judicial review provi-
sions of the APA, I am persuaded that its scope of review is the 
administrative record before the IRS, and that the Tax Court 
can only review the [IRS’s] exercise of discretion for an abuse of 
discretion pursuant to [the APA.]”217 
 Accordingly, the supersized Ninth Circuit and Tax Court 
are on one side of the issue, with the D.C. and Fifth Circuits on 
the other, and the Eleventh Circuit somewhere in between. 
Moreover, district courts and the Court of Federal Claims also 
review innocent spouse claims on occasion in the context of a 
 
 212. Mitchell v. Comm’r, 292 F.3d 800, 807 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (“As the deci-
sion whether to grant this equitable relief is committed by its terms to the dis-
cretion of the Secretary, the Tax Court and this Court review such a decision 
for abuse of discretion.”); Cheshire v. Comm’r, 282 F.3d 326, 338 (5th Cir. 
2002) (similarly reviewing for abuse of discretion). 
 213. Comm’r v. Neal, 557 F.3d 1262, 1264 (11th Cir. 2009). 
 214. Id. at 1263 (“Both parties agree that the Tax Court appropriately used 
an abuse of discretion standard of review . . . .”). 
 215. Id. at 1278 (Tjoflat, J., dissenting). Judge Tjoflat’s dissent takes a sim-
ilar first-principles approach as set forth in Part II.A. See id. at 1278–87. 
 216. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 982 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 217. Id. at 996 (Bybee, J., dissenting). Like Judge Tjoflat in Neal, Judge 
Bybee takes a first-principles approach similar to the one presented in Part 
II.A . See id. at 994–1012. 
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refund suit.218 To date, they have reviewed such claims for 
abuse of discretion.219 
The issue is not confusing if one returns to first principles. 
As discussed in Part II.A, the Supreme Court has instructed 
courts to “apply the APA’s court/agency review standards in the 
absence of an exception” set forth by statute.220 To depart from 
the APA default, the Internal Revenue Code must suggest 
“more than a possibility of a [different] standard, and indeed 
more than even a bare preponderance of evidence”; the excep-
tion “must be clear.”221 So let’s turn to the relevant text of the 
Code.  
Under § 6015(f), the IRS “may relieve” an innocent spouse 
of joint and several liability if relief is not available through the 
other two innocent spouse provisions and “taking into account 
all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold the in-
dividual liable.”222 As discussed in Part I.B.2, Congress intend-
ed to grant discretion to the IRS in equitable innocent spouse 
claims. This in and of itself suggests that judicial review of 
such discretionary determinations should be for abuse of discre-
tion. All innocent spouse claims are subject to judicial review 
under § 6015(e), which provides that the taxpayer may file a 
“[p]etition for review by Tax Court” to “petition the Tax Court 
(and the Tax Court shall have jurisdiction) to determine the 
appropriate relief available to the individual under this sec-
tion.”223 The Internal Revenue Code is silent on the standard 
and scope of review. That should be the end of the inquiry. 
What clear evidence does the Tax Court have for departing 
from the default APA standards? As a preliminary matter, the 
Tax Court has not provided cogent analysis on this point, likely 
because of its tax exceptionalist view that the APA does not ap-
ply at all. But the principal statutory argument it makes for de 
novo standard and scope of review is that Congress used the 
term “determine”: “The use of the word ‘determine’ suggests 
that Congress intended us to use a de novo standard of review 
as well as scope of review.”224 As Judge Bybee remarks, “That is 
 
 218. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(e)(3) (2012). 
 219. See, e.g., Flores v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 49, 51 n.1 (2001); accord 
Mitchell v. Comm’r, 292 F.3d 800, 807 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (citing Flores for apply-
ing abuse of discretion in federal court and not just Tax Court).  
 220. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999). 
 221. Id. at 154–55. 
 222. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f). 
 223. Id. § 6015(e)(1). 
 224. Porter v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 203, 208 (2009) (en banc).  
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a lot of weight to put on the word ‘determine,’ and I do not 
think it can bear it.”225 This is particularly true in light of the 
fact there must be “clear” evidence of “statutory intent [for] leg-
islative departure from the [APA] norm,”226 and “[e]xemptions 
from the terms of the Administrative Procedure Act are not 
lightly to be presumed.”227 Indeed, the APA plainly states that 
“[n]o subsequent legislation”—such as the innocent spouse sec-
tion of the Internal Revenue Code—“shall be held to supersede 
or modify the provisions of [the APA] except to the extent that 
such legislation shall do so expressly.”228 
The use of the term “determine” falls far short of this ex-
acting standard. As Judge Bybee has chronicled, Congress 
knows how to provide for de novo scope229 and standard230 of re-
view. And when Congress has intended for a de novo determi-
nation, it has provided for a “de novo determination.”231 Moreo-
ver, remember that Congress provided for the Tax Court to 
“redetermine” tax deficiencies, yet only to “determine” innocent 
spouse claims.232 There is a longstanding “presum[ption] that, 
where words differ as they differ here, Congress acts intention-
ally and purposely in the disparate inclusion or exclusion.”233 In 
 
 225. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 1004 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dis-
senting).  
 226. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 155 (1999). 
 227. Marcello v. Bonds, 349 U.S. 302, 310 (1955). 
 228. 5 U.S.C. § 559. 
 229. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 1004 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dis-
senting) (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 706(2)(F), 7702(e)(3), 7703(c) (2012); 7 U.S.C. 
§§ 499g(c), 2023(a)(15) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 657(a), (c) (2012); 38 U.S.C. 
§ 7261(c) (2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 300e–9(d)(3), 1995 (2012); 47 U.S.C. § 504(a) 
(2012)).  
 230. Wilson, 705 F.3d at 1005 (Bybee, J., dissenting) (citing, 6 U.S.C. 
§ 1142(c)(7) (2012); 12 U.S.C. §§ 1828(c)(7)(A), 1849(b)(1), 5567(c)(4)(D)(i) 
(2012); 15 U.S.C. §§ 2087(b)(4), 3414(b)(6)(F) (2012); 16 U.S.C. § 823b(b), 
(d)(3)(B) (2012); 18 U.S.C. §§ 1514A(b)(1)(B), 3613A(b)(1), 3742(e) (2012); 19 
U.S.C. § 1625(b) (2012); 21 U.S.C. § 399d(b)(4)(A) (2012); 22 U.S.C. 
§ 4140(b)(2) (2012); 28 U.S.C. § 2265(c)(3) (2012); 30 U.S.C. § 1300(j)(4)(ii)(I) 
(2012); 42 U.S.C. §§ 2282a(c)(3)(B), 5851(b)(4), 6303(d)(3)(B), 8433(d)(3)(B) 
(2012); 49 U.S.C. §§ 20109(d)(3), 31105(c) (2012)).  
 231. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(6) (providing for “a de novo determina-
tion of the issue by the court”); 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (“A judge of the court 
shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report . . . .”).  
 232. Compare 26 U.S.C. § 6015(e)(1) (2012), with id. § 6214(a). See general-
ly infra Part II.B.1. 
 233. Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (in-
ternal quotation marks omitted); accord ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GAR-
NER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS 170 (2012) 
(“[W]here the document has used one term in one place, and a materially dif-
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all events, the use of the term “determine”—without more—is 
not the type of clear or express command from Congress to de-
part from the APA default rules.234 
3. Review of Collection Due Process Decisions 
Like the innocent spouse statute, the judicial review sec-
tion of the collection due process statute provides no standard 
or scope of review. It merely says that the taxpayer “may, with-
in 30 days of a[n IRS] determination under this section, appeal 
such determination to the Tax Court (and the Tax Court shall 
have jurisdiction with respect to such matter).”235 Accordingly, 
the APA default provisions should govern the Tax Court’s re-
view of IRS determinations concerning collection due process 
complaints. 
The Tax Court agrees that the standard of review is abuse 
of discretion (when tax liability is not at issue236), but not be-
cause it feels bound by the APA. Instead, the Tax Court relies 
on the legislative history of § 6330.237 That legislative history—
which refers to judicial review in the Tax Court and federal dis-
trict courts—is unambiguous: “Where the validity of the tax li-
ability is not properly part of the appeal, the taxpayer may 
challenge the determination of the appeals officer for abuse of 
discretion.”238 It is thus no surprise that courts have held that 
abuse of discretion is also the standard of review of such IRS 
determinations being reviewed in the federal district courts.239 
 
ferent term in another, the presumption is that the different term denotes a 
different idea.”).  
 234. Judge Bybee aptly responds to a number of other arguments that are 
less persuasive and thus not covered here. See Wilson, 705 F.3d at 1004–12 
(Bybee, J., dissenting). 
 235. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(1). 
 236. As discussed in Part II.B.1, the Tax Court does and should apply a de 
novo standard of review whenever tax liability or deficiency is challenged in 
light of the Tax Court’s unique history, the use of the term “redetermine,” and 
the statutory burden-shifting scheme that suggests de novo standard and 
scope of review. The legislative history of § 6330 reinforces this position:  
Where the validity of the tax liability was properly at issue in the 
hearing, and where the determination with regard to the tax liability 
is a part of the appeal, no levy may take place during the pendency of 
the appeal. The amount of the tax liability will in such cases be re-
viewed by the appropriate court on a de novo basis. 
H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266 (1998). 
 237. Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 176, 179 (2000). 
 238. H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266. (1998). 
 239. See, e.g., Olsen v. United States, 414 F.3d 144, 150–51 (1st Cir. 2005) 
(“In a CDP case in which, as here, the amount of the underlying tax liability is 
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With respect to the scope of review, however, the Tax Court 
does not follow the APA default. For instance, in Robinette v. 
Commissioner, the Tax Court concluded that “when reviewing 
for abuse of discretion under § 6330(d), we are not limited by 
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and our review is not 
limited to the administrative record.”240 In reaching this conclu-
sion, the Tax Court relied on the historical underpinnings of its 
tax deficiency jurisdiction to conclude that the APA did not ap-
ply at all to its review under § 6330:  
Although § 6330 postdates the APA, the APA judicial review provi-
sions are not applicable. The APA does not “limit or repeal additional 
requirements imposed by statute or otherwise recognized by law.” The 
Court’s de novo procedures for reviewing IRS functions were well es-
tablished and “recognized by law” at the time of the APA’s enact-
ment.241 
The Eighth Circuit, in a unanimous opinion authored by 
Judge Colloton, reversed, holding that “[n]othing in the text or 
history of the Restructuring and Reform Act of 1998 clearly in-
dicates an intent by Congress to permit trials de novo in the 
Tax Court when that court reviews decisions of IRS appeals of-
ficers under § 6330. If anything, the available evidence sug-
gests the opposite.”242 The court found it particularly difficult to 
square a de novo scope of review—absent some express indica-
tion by Congress—with the legislative history that unambigu-
ously directed for an abuse of discretion standard of review.243 
Finally, the court noted:  
Every district court to consider an appeal under § 6330 has limited its 
review to the record created before the agency, and it would be anom-
alous to conclude that Congress intended in § 6330(d) to create dis-
parate forms of judicial review depending on which court was review-
ing the decision of an IRS appeals officer in a collection due process 
proceeding.244 
 
not at issue, the trial court and the court of appeals review the determination 
of the IRS appeals officer for abuse of discretion.”); Living Care Alternatives of 
Utica, Inc. v. United States, 411 F.3d 621, 625 (6th Cir. 2005) (applying an 
abuse of discretion standard); Jones v. Comm’r, 338 F.3d 463, 466 (5th Cir. 
2003) (applying an abuse of discretion standard for Tax Court and Article III 
court). 
 240. Robinette v. Comm’r, 123 T.C. 85, 95 (2004), rev’d, 439 F.3d 455 (8th 
Cir. 2006); see also Cords, supra note 63, at 457 n.185 (gathering published 
and unpublished Tax Court opinions on point). 
 241. Robinette, 123 T.C. at 97 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 559 (2000)). 
 242. Robinette v. Comm’r, 439 F. 3d 455, 460 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 243. Id. at 460–61.  
 244. Id. at 461 (internal citations omitted).  
WALKER Hoffer_4fmt 11/6/2014 4:19 PM 
2014] TAX COURT EXCEPTIONALISM 263 
 
Moreover, the Tax Court in Robinette observed that 
“[n]othing in the legislative history of §§ 6330 or 6320 indi-
cates . . . that the Court’s review is limited to the administra-
tive record.”245 The Eighth Circuit did not bother to address this 
point. It is worth noting, however, that the same legislative his-
tory that sets forth the abuse of discretion standard of review 
states that “[n]o further hearings are provided under this pro-
vision as a matter of right. It is the responsibility of the tax-
payer to raise all relevant issues at the time of the pre-levy 
hearing.”246 Accordingly, not only is there no evidence in the 
statute that suggests Congress intended to depart from the de-
fault APA scope of review, but the legislative history suggests 
the opposite. And, by not including these instructions in the 
statute itself but only in the legislative history, one could rea-
sonably conclude the congressional drafters understood that 
statutory silence resulted in these default APA judicial review 
standards. 
Several months after Robinette, the First Circuit joined the 
Eighth Circuit, holding that “[t]he Tax Court, like the district 
court, is charged with determining whether the IRS’s rulings 
during a [collection due process] hearing were within its discre-
tion. Thus, judicial review normally should be limited to the in-
formation that was before the IRS when making the challenged 
rulings.”247 This issue has received a fair amount of scholarly 
attention, with commentators agreeing with the First and 
Eighth Circuit that the APA’s record-review rule applies to the 
Tax Court’s review of IRS collection due process determina-
tions.248 
4. The Tax Court and the Ordinary Remand Rule 
One final observation is not about a specific type of claim, 
but about the Tax Court’s position on the ordinary remand rule 
in its review of IRS actions.  
 
 245. Robinette, 123 T.C. at 99. 
 246. H.R. REP. NO. 105-599, at 266 (1998).  
 247. Murphy v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2006). 
 248. See Cords, supra note 63, at 453–65; Fahey, supra note 32, at 609–15; 
Christine K. Lane, On-the-Record Review of CDP Determinations: An Exami-
nation of Policy Reasons Encouraging Judges to Stick to the Administrative 
Record, 6 FLA. ST. U. BUS. L. REV. 149, 156–59 (2007); Nick A. Zotos, Service 
Collection Abuse of Discretion: What Is the Appropriate Standard of Review 
and Scope of the Record in Collection Due Process Appeals?, 62 TAX LAW. 223, 
225–28 (2008).  
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Consider first the context of collection due process claims. 
As noted in Part I.B.3, IRS collection due process hearings are 
not subject to the APA’s formal adjudication hearing require-
ments,249 and they may “not be a single event, but may instead 
be a series of telephonic or written correspondence taking place 
over time.”250 The applicable regulations suggest that a face-to-
face meeting ordinarily will be offered to requesting taxpayers 
whose argument is not frivolous.251 The IRS is not required to 
create a transcript or recording of the hearing, and the taxpay-
er has no right to subpoena or examine witnesses.252 As Bryan 
Camp explains, “hearings can sometimes be so informal that a 
taxpayer may not understand that one took place until receiv-
ing the Notice of Determination.”253  
Due to the informal nature of the IRS proceeding, there 
may be little or no record available for meaningful review. As a 
matter of policy, therefore, it may be more fair and effective to 
allow the Tax Court to consider evidence and testimony from 
both the taxpayer and the IRS. But that policy concern is mis-
placed and contrary to administrative common law. As the Su-
preme Court has instructed, “if the reviewing court simply can-
not evaluate the challenged agency action on the basis of the 
record before it, the proper course, except in rare circumstanc-
es, is to remand to the agency for additional investigation or 
explanation.”254 As discussed in Part III, remanding to the IRS 
to further develop the record—and accompanying such remand 
with certain dialogue-enhancing tools—is a better policy be-
cause it forces the IRS to properly develop a record and reach 
sound conclusions based on that developed record. And such a 
remand not only affects that particular case, but should also 
have system-wide effects on how the IRS handles collection due 
process complaints. 
The Tax Court, however, has disavowed the applicability of 
administrative law’s ordinary remand rule (and the IRS ap-
pears to have acquiesced).255 Instead, the Tax Court believes it-
 
 249. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d) Q&A (6)(D) (2013). 
 250. Camp, supra note 121, at 83. 
 251. Treas. Reg. § 301.6330-1(d) Q&A (7)(D). 
 252. Id. 
 253. Camp, supra note 121, at 84. 
 254. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985).  
 255. See Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980 (9th Cir. 2013) I.R.S. Notice CC-
2013-011, at 2 n.1 (June 7, 2013) (“The trial attorney should not move the Tax 
Court to remand these cases for a determination by the Service regarding sec-
tion 6015 relief. In Friday v. Commissioner, 124 T.C. 220 (2005), the Tax 
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self unable to remand unless Congress has expressly reserved 
jurisdiction to the IRS. For instance, in the collection due pro-
cess context, the Internal Revenue Code provides that the IRS 
retains jurisdiction over the case during the Tax Court’s review 
and may consider how a change in the taxpayer’s circumstanc-
es affects its original determination.256 By contrast, the Code 
provides no such express retention of jurisdiction with respect 
to innocent spouse claims (or deficiency redeterminations); ac-
cordingly, the Tax Court has held that it lacks the power to re-
mand issues to the IRS in those circumstances.257 Indeed, the 
Tax Court relies on this misperception (regarding its remand 
ability) to justify de novo review of IRS actions, noting that 
“[a]n abuse of discretion standard of review is also at odds with 
our decision to decline to remand [innocent spouse] cases for re-
consideration.”258  
The Tax Court’s approach here, again, reflects a tax 
exceptionalist view of administrative law, and a return to first 
principles leads to a different analysis and conclusion. The Su-
preme Court in Dickinson held that a reviewing court must 
“apply the APA’s court/agency review standards in the absence 
of an exception” set forth by Congress.259 More recently, in 
Mayo, the Court relied on Dickinson to conclude that this 
standard applies to departures from administrative common 
law rules (there, Chevron in the tax context) and not just the 
APA statutory defaults.260 And the Court has instructed repeat-
 
Court held that section 6015 does not provide for remand.”). 
 256. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(2) (2012). 
 257.  See Friday v. Comm’r, 124 T.C. 220, 221–22 (2005) (citing Parker v. 
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2004-226, for the proposition that a collection due process 
“case may be remanded to the [IRS] Appeals Office for further consideration,” 
but holding that an innocent spouse case may not be remanded due to the lack 
of a jurisdiction retention provision on the corresponding statutory section); 
accord Wilson, 705 F.3d at 989 (citing Friday and discussing the Tax Court’s 
position that it cannot remand innocent spouse cases to the IRS). District 
courts have similarly remanded collection due process cases to the IRS. See, 
e.g., Herycyk v. United States, No. 4:01-CV-00058, 2001 WL 1836194, at *4 
(N.D. Ohio Dec. 11, 2001). But see Montijo v. United States, No. CV-S-01-0423-
RLH RJJ, 2002 WL 507573, at *1–2 (D. Nev. Feb. 22, 2002) (refusing to re-
mand to the IRS because the parties failed to provide any authority to justify 
such remand). 
 258. Porter v. Comm’r, 132 T.C. 203, 209 (2009); accord id. at 220 (Gale, J., 
concurring); id. at 225 (Wells, J., dissenting); see also Wilson, 705 F.3d at 1011 
(Bybee, J., dissenting) (“The Tax Court has expressed its concern that it can-
not remand such cases to the Secretary as justification for its de novo re-
view.”). 
 259. Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999). 
 260. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
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edly that, when an agency has erred or the administrative rec-
ord is otherwise insufficient to determine whether the agency 
has erred, “the proper course, except in rare circumstances, is 
to remand to the agency for additional investigation or expla-
nation.”261 In other words, “the guiding principle . . . is that the 
function of the reviewing court ends when an error of law is 
laid bare. At that point the matter once more goes to the [agen-
cy] for reconsideration.”262 This ordinary remand rule preceded 
the APA.263 
Nothing in the Internal Revenue Code suggests a depar-
ture from this remand rule when the APA’s default standard 
and scope of review provisions apply. That the Code retains ju-
risdiction for the IRS during the pendency of the Tax Court’s 
review and thereafter in one context (collection due process 
cases)264 but not in others (innocent spouse cases, deficiency de-
terminations, etc.) is not the type of clear evidence that Con-
gress intended to depart from the default administrative law 
doctrines. Nor, as discussed in Part III, are there compelling 
policy considerations that would suggest such departure when 
the APA’s default standard and scope of review provisions ap-
ply. 
This does not mean, however, that the Tax Court must re-
mand every erroneous IRS determination to the IRS for recon-
sideration. As the ordinary remand rule suggests, it is the “or-
dinary” rule subject to exceptions for “rare circumstances.”265 
These rare circumstances include when there are minor errors 
as to subsidiary issues that do not affect the agency’s ultimate 
decision or when the agency lacks authority to decide the is-
 
704, 713 (2011) (refusing “to carve out an approach to administrative review 
good for tax law only” because of the “importance of maintaining a uniform 
approach to judicial review of administrative action” (quoting Dickinson, 527 
U.S. at 154)). 
 261. Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 523 (2009) (quoting Gonzales v. 
Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 186 (2006) (per curiam), in turn quoting INS v. Ventu-
ra, 537 U.S. 12, 16 (2002) (per curiam), in turn quoting Fla. Power & Light Co. 
v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985)). 
 262. Fed. Power Comm’n v. Idaho Power Co., 344 U.S. 17, 20 (1952) (re-
versing the D.C. Circuit’s order for the agency to issue a license the agency 
had previously denied). 
 263. See SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947); SEC v. Chenery 
Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 95 (1943). See generally Walker, The Ordinary Remand 
Rule, supra note 40 (manuscript at Part I) (tracing the evolution of the ordi-
nary remand rule from Chenery to modern day). 
 264. 26 U.S.C. § 6330(d)(2) (2012).  
 265.  Negusie, 555 U.S. at 523 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
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sue.266 And there is another exception of particular relevance 
here: when APA § 706(2)(F) applies and “the facts are subject to 
trial de novo by the reviewing court.”267 In particular, in expli-
cating the ordinary remand rule and how it is “the proper 
course, except in rare circumstances,” the Supreme Court has 
noted that “[t]he reviewing court is not generally empowered to 
conduct a de novo inquiry into the matter being reviewed and 
to reach its own conclusions based on such an inquiry.”268 Logi-
cally, then, if the reviewing court is empowered to conduct a 
trial de novo, the court is not required to remand (though it re-
tains discretion to do so) because de novo review allows the 
court to take the unusual step of substituting its judgment for 
that of the agency.269 
In light of these principles, it becomes clear that the Tax 
Court need not remand when it conducts a trial de novo. As ex-
plained in Part II.A, the Tax Court conducts a trial de novo of 
an IRS tax deficiency determination in any proceeding in which 
the underlying deficiency determination is challenged. (That 
said, as discussed in Part III, in some circumstances policy con-
siderations may weigh in favor of the Tax Court exercising its 
discretion to remand even some de novo redeterminations to 
the IRS.)270 But when the trial de novo provisions of APA 
 
 266.  See Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, supra note 40 (manuscript 
at end of Part I) (discussing exceptions). 
 267. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(F) (2012). 
 268. Fla. Power & Light Co. v. Lorion, 470 U.S. 729, 744 (1985). 
 269. Although the logic of this principle seems sound, to date few courts 
have addressed the issue. See, e.g., Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 997 (9th 
Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dissenting) (“Except when the reviewing court is author-
ized to conduct a trial de novo, the court’s review is confined because ‘[t]he 
court is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency.’” 
(quoting Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 
(1971))); United States v. UPS Customhouse Brokerage, Inc., 686 F. Supp. 2d 
1337, 1351 (Ct. Int’l Trade 2010) (“As to remand, the Court is authorized by 28 
U.S.C. § 2640(a)(6) to decide the issues in this case at a trial de novo, so re-
mand is not required.”); see also infra note 270 (citing cases from ERISA con-
text).  
 270. In the ERISA context where the remand rule also exists, see 
Conkright v. Frommert, 130 S. Ct. 1640, 1646–47, 1651–52 (2010), courts have 
recognized this distinction—that a reviewing court only has discretion not to 
remand when the standard of review is de novo. See, e.g., Quesinberry v. Life 
Ins. Co. of N. Am., 987 F.2d 1017, 1025 n.6 (4th Cir. 1993) (“We do not believe, 
however, that remand in every case of an inadequate record is consistent with 
the de novo standard of review or in the interests of judicial economy.”); Fitts 
v. Unum Life Ins. Co. of Am., No. 98-00617, 2007 WL 1334974, at *21 (D.D.C. 
May 7, 2007) (“Remand to a plan administrator is not necessary where the 
court develops a factual record in making its de novo determination.” (citing 
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§ 706(2)(F) do not apply, the Tax Court should adhere to the 
ordinary remand rule. The following Part turns to the policy 
case for adhering to this rule and the APA default judicial re-
view provisions. 
III. THE POLICY CASE AGAINST TAX COURT 
EXCEPTIONALISM   
The legal case against Tax Court exceptionalism set forth 
in Part II is compelling and should be sufficient to encourage 
the Tax Court to reverse course and consider itself bound by 
the APA’s judicial review provisions—just like every other 
court that reviews federal agency action. The policy case, how-
ever, reinforces the legal case and provides additional reasons 
why the Tax Court should embrace the APA and traditional 
administrative law principles.  
Part III.A reviews the policy considerations in favor of the 
package of default judicial review standards addressed in this 
Article; the abuse of discretion standard of review, the record-
bound scope of review, and the ordinary remand rule. Part III.A 
also addresses and dismisses policy counterarguments that tax 
law and administration should be excepted from these general 
administrative law principles. A comprehensive normative 
analysis of this APA default package is surprisingly absent in 
the literature. And our counterintuitive conclusion that the 
APA default package may allow a court to have a greater sys-
temic effect on agency decision-making is similarly missing. 
Part III.B then presents a number of judicial tools that 
courts have developed in other administrative law contexts to 
enrich their dialogue with agencies as well as to help ensure on 
remand that petitioners do not get lost and that relief is not 
unduly delayed or denied. These dialogue-enhancing tools help 
alleviate the policy considerations against deferential review of 
IRS determinations. In particular, such tools help the review-
ing court play a more active role in improving equity, efficiency, 
and consistency at the IRS generally rather than just in the 
limited number of cases that make it to the Tax Court. That the 
vast majority of unrepresented taxpayers never seek judicial 
review of adverse IRS decisions should encourage the Tax 
Court to engage in a richer dialogue with the IRS via the ordi-
 
Casey v. Uddeholm Corp., 32 F.3d 1094, 1099 n.4 (7th Cir. 1994))); Dionida v. 
Reliance Standard Life Ins. Co., 50 F. Supp. 2d 934, 942 (N.D. Cal. 1999) 
(“[R]emand is available even on de novo review.”). 
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nary remand rule in order to have a more systemic effect on the 
quality of adjudication that takes place at the IRS. 
A. RATIONALES FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AGENCY ACTION 
Before examining policy rationales for the APA’s default 
judicial deference to agency action, it is important to frame this 
policy discussion against the backdrop of the Tax Court’s con-
cerns about deferring to IRS determinations. Consistency and 
equity are among the most important policy goals in tax admin-
istration as well as in the modern administrative state more 
generally.271 At first blush, the Tax Court’s use of less deferen-
tial review standards would seem to advance these goals be-
cause more searching judicial review allows the court to correct 
errors that would otherwise go uncorrected. 
Take, for example, the litigation of innocent spouse cases. 
The IRS’s success rate on appeal is perennially low.272 In 2013, 
the IRS litigated twenty-one cases on the merits of granting in-
nocent spouse relief, and of these cases, it lost thirty-six per-
cent.273 The year of 2012 was even worse. The IRS prevailed ful-
ly in only twenty-one out of forty such cases, and it received 
split decisions in eight more.274 Of these twenty-nine full and 
partial successes, ten were decided purely on procedural 
grounds, such as standard of review or whether the claim could 
be raised as a defense in a collection action or interpleader suit, 
meaning that the IRS prevailed on the merits in, at most, nine-
teen out of forty cases.275 It had similar records in the years 
 
 271. One of the authors explores the importance of consistency in tax ad-
ministration in a somewhat related context. See Stephanie Hoffer, Hobgoblin 
of Little Minds No More: Justice Requires an IRS Duty of Consistency, 2006 
UTAH L. REV. 317, 326–44 (2006) (discussing the IRS’s duty of consistency).  
 272. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2012 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 654 
(2012) [hereinafter NTA 2012 REPORT], http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov 
/userfiles/file/Full-Report/volume-1.pdf (“[I]n cases decided on the merits [in 
2012], the IRS fully prevailed less than half the time.”)  
 273. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2013 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 412 
(2013) [hereinafter NTA 2013 REPORT], http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/ 
userfiles/file/2013-Annual-Report-to-Congress-Executive-Summary.pdf. These 
cases included stand-alone requests for innocent spouse relief, as well as re-
quests brought in conjunction with deficiency determinations or collection due 
process claims. Id. 
 274. NTA 2012 REPORT, supra note 272, at 647. This record led the Na-
tional Taxpayer Advocate to report to Congress that “[i]n order to avoid impos-
ing unnecessary burden on taxpayers, the IRS must analyze the reasons for 
this outcome and determine what training would help avert it.” Id. at 654.   
 275. Id. at 647. According to the National Taxpayer Advocate, the IRS suc-
ceeded on the merits in only 15 of its cases in 2012, for a success rate of 45%. 
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2009 through 2011.276 These reversal rates are surprising given 
the agency’s pre-litigation procedure. Before innocent spouse 
cases reach the Tax Court, claimants engage in alternative dis-
pute resolution in which the IRS considers its risks of litigation 
while crafting a settlement offer.277 Because the IRS is a repeat 
player with institutional knowledge, one would expect it to 
push for settlement in both losing and uncertain cases.  
The Tax Court’s consistently high reversal rate suggests ei-
ther that the court plays an important role in protecting tax-
payer rights and policy goals by placing a necessary check on 
improper agency decision-making, or that the court is improp-
erly overriding procedurally and legally sound agency determi-
nations. On balance, the former may be more likely true, given 
that appellate courts upheld the Tax Court in all of the appel-
late decisions reviewed by the National Taxpayer Advocate for 
its 2012 and 2013 reports to Congress.278 The 2012 report char-
acterized the IRS’s performance in the innocent spouse arena 
as an “unnecessary burden” to taxpayers, and it called on the 
IRS to provide additional training to employees to improve 
agency administration in this context.279  
Against this backdrop, de novo review by the Tax Court in 
the absence of remand adds some value to federal tax admin-
istration. This does not suggest, however, that tax policy goals 
are optimized by the court’s current stance. In fact, as dis-
cussed in Part III.A.5, because lack of remand demands so little 
 
Id. at 648. This figure did not include split decisions. Id. 
 276. Of innocent spouse cases decided on the merits, the IRS prevailed in 
only 46% in 2011, 62% in 2010, and 52% in 2009. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 
2011 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS app. 3, tbl. 8 (2011) [hereinafter NTA 
2011 REPORT], http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov//userfiles/file/IRS% 
20TAS%20ARC%202011%20VOL%201.pdf; NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2010 
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS app.3, tbl.10 (2010) [hereinafter NTA 2010 RE-
PORT], http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/files/ExecSummary_2010ARC.pdf; 
NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS app. 3, tbl. 
10 (2009) [hereinafter NTA 2009 REPORT], http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
utl/1_09_tas_arc_vol_1_preface_toc_msp.pdf. 
 277. See Rev. Proc. 2003-19, 2003-5 I.R.B. 371 (Feb. 3, 2003) (setting forth 
IRS Office of Appeals review process); 26 C.F.R. § 601.106 (2012) (describing 
IRS appeals function). 
 278. NTA 2013 REPORT, supra note 273, app. 3, tbl.10. The National Tax-
payer Advocate reviewed all appellate decisions rendered between June 1, 
2012 through May 31, 2013 in which courts rendered an opinion available 
through commercial legal databases, including opinions appearing in the Fed-
eral Appendix. Id. at 322; see also NTA 2012 REPORT, supra note 272, app. 3, 
tbl. 9 (listing Tax Court case results from 2012).  
 279. NTA 2012 REPORT, supra note 272, at 654.  
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of the IRS, the opposite may be true. Moreover, although the 
Tax Court’s current position may improve accuracy in litigated 
cases, correcting agency errors is not the sole or predominant 
policy objective in the modern administrative state. If it were, 
the APA’s default judicial review standards would be de novo, 
not abuse of discretion and record-bound review. There are, of 
course, other policy considerations implicated, including re-
specting the proper separation of powers, leveraging agency ex-
pertise, encouraging consistency, promoting efficiency, and pre-
serving equity. Each will be addressed in turn.  
1. Separation of Powers 
One of the predominant themes in administrative law is 
proper respect for congressional delegation of policymaking and 
adjudicative authority to the federal agency tasked with carry-
ing out those objectives. As the Supreme Court has empha-
sized, where Congress has delegated the authority to an agen-
cy, “a judicial judgment cannot be made to do service for an 
administrative judgment,” because “an appellate court cannot 
intrude upon the domain which Congress has exclusively en-
trusted to an administrative agency.”280 It is thus generally 
sound policy for courts (including the Tax Court) to respect leg-
islative supremacy281 and serve as faithful agents to its legisla-
tive principal. 
This rationale is not just a circular argument that it is 
good policy to follow the law. In the administrative law context, 
adhering to congressional commands has a constitutional di-
mension.282 As the Supreme Court has remarked, failure to de-
fer properly to the agency “would propel the court into the do-
main which Congress has set aside exclusively for the 
administrative agency.”283 Not only does this frustrate the prop-
er separation of powers between Congress and the court (Arti-
 
 280. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80, 88 (1943). 
 281. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”). 
 282. One of the authors explores these separation-of-powers concerns in 
greater detail elsewhere. See Christopher J. Walker, Avoiding Normative Can-
ons in the Review of Administrative Interpretations of Law: A Brand X Doc-
trine of Constitutional Avoidance, 64 ADMIN. L. REV. 139, 173–182 (2012) 
[hereinafter Walker, Brand X Doctrine of Constitutional Avoidance] (exploring 
these dual separation-of-powers concerns in the context of Chevron deference 
and modern constitutional avoidance); Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, 
supra note 40 (manuscript at Part I.A) (discussing the same in the context of 
the ordinary remand rule). 
 283. SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 196 (1947). 
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cle I problem) but also between the court and the Executive 
(Article II problem). After all, the President has the constitu-
tional duty to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully execut-
ed.”284 This duty involves determining the facts relevant for en-
forcement, applying the law to facts, and making policy 
judgments about enforcement. Thus, as William Kelley has ex-
plained, when a court decides an issue that Congress has 
placed within the Executive’s responsibility to implement, “the 
practical effect is for the Court to dictate how the laws shall be 
executed, or, more precisely, how they shall not be. That arro-
gation by the Court creates the serious potential for violating 
Article II by displacing the President as executor of the laws.”285  
Moreover, the Supreme Court has emphasized that defer-
ence to agency actions based on these concerns reinforces core 
democratic principles of political accountability: 
Judges are not experts in the field, and are not part of either political 
branch of the Government. Courts must, in some cases, reconcile 
competing political interests, but not on the basis of the judges’ per-
sonal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has 
delegated policy-making responsibilities may, within the limits of that 
delegation, properly rely upon the incumbent administration’s views 
of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not directly 
accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely 
appropriate for this political branch of the Government to make such 
policy choices—resolving the competing interests which Congress it-
self either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be re-
solved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in 
light of everyday realities.286 
The context of the Tax Court’s review of the IRS equitable 
innocent spouse determinations is illustrative of these delega-
tion and accountability concerns. As set forth in Part II.B.2, 
 
 284. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3. 
 285. William K. Kelley, Avoiding Constitutional Questions as a Three-
Branch Problem, 86 CORNELL L. REV. 831, 883 (2001). Some scholars have 
taken the Article II argument a step further. See Jack Goldsmith & John F. 
Manning, The President’s Completion Power, 115 YALE L.J. 2280, 2282 (2006) 
(arguing that the President has constitutional authority to fill in the holes of 
any statutory scheme, subject to congressional override). 
 286. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 
865–66 (1984); see also Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. 
L. REV. 2245, 2373 (2001) (“As first conceived, the Chevron deference rule had 
its deepest roots in a conception of agencies as instruments of the President, 
entitled to make policy choices, within the gaps left by Congress, by virtue of 
his relationship to the public.”); Randolph J. May, Defining Deference Down: 
Independent Agencies and Chevron Deference, 58 ADMIN. L. REV. 429, 447 
(2006) (arguing that “the agency expertise justification plays second fiddle to 
the primary political accountability rationale in Chevron.”). 
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Congress has provided that the IRS “may relieve” an innocent 
spouse of joint and several liability if relief is not available 
through the other two innocent spouse claims and “taking into 
account all the facts and circumstances, it is inequitable to hold 
the individual liable.”287 In other words, as Judge Bybee con-
cluded, Congress has double-delegated the discretion to grant 
such relief to the IRS: “Congress has both made the grant of 
innocent spouse relief a matter of equity and committed it to 
the discretion of the Secretary of the Treasury or his delegee 
[the IRS].”288 Accordingly, by reviewing such determinations de 
novo (and without a remand) as opposed to on the administra-
tive record for abuse of discretion, the Tax Court has impermis-
sibly substituted its judgment for the discretionary and equita-
ble judgment of the IRS. Indeed, contrary to congressional 
command, the Tax Court decides the issue anew, based on the 
evidence submitted to the Tax Court, as if the IRS had not act-
ed at all.289 
2. Expertise 
The main rationales for judicial deference to agency action 
are often grouped into “two faces”—congressional delegation, 
discussed above, and comparative agency expertise.290 As Rich-
 
 287. 26 U.S.C. § 6015(f) (2012). 
 288. Wilson v. Comm’r, 705 F.3d 980, 1001 (9th Cir. 2013) (Bybee, J., dis-
senting). 
 289. To be sure, the Tax Court is an Article I court with judges appointed 
to fifteen-year terms, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 7441, 7443, not an Article III court with 
life-tenured judges, but it is still a court of the United States that “exercises 
judicial power to the exclusion of any other function.” Freytag v. Comm’r, 501 
U.S. 868, 891 (1991). 
 290. Note, The Two Faces of Chevron, 120 HARV. L. REV. 1562, 1562–63 
(2007); accord Emily Hammond Meazell, Presidential Control, Expertise, and 
the Deference Dilemma, 61 DUKE L.J. 1763, 1764 (2012) (“Judicial deference to 
administrative agencies is often grounded in presidential control and compar-
ative institutional expertise.” (footnote omitted)); see also, e.g., Ronald J. 
Krotoszynski, Jr., Why Deference?: Implied Delegations, Agency Expertise, and 
the Misplaced Legacy of Skidmore, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 735, 737 (2002) (arguing 
that “the expertise rationale provides a stronger justification for giving defer-
ence to agency work product than does the implied delegation theory”); Reuel 
E. Schiller, The Era of Deference: Courts, Expertise, and the Emergence of New 
Deal Administrative Law, 106 MICH. L. REV. 399, 441 (2007) (explaining that 
the “New Deal-era administrative law was not to last long, but it firmly de-
fined the role of expertise in the administrative state and created the model of 
judicial deference that would be both emulated and reacted against as admin-
istrative law developed during the rest of the twentieth century.”); Cass R. 
Sunstein, Chevron Step Zero, 92 VA. L. REV. 187, 200 (2006) (distinguishing 
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ard Pierce has observed, “[a]n agency with expertise in a par-
ticular area of regulation has an enormous advantage over a 
reviewing court in making this complicated judgment.”291 The 
Mayo Court, for instance, recognized “agency expertise” as one 
reason for courts according Chevron deference to IRS interpre-
tations of the Internal Revenue Code.292 
Agency expertise is a strong justification for the general 
application of all three of the default administrative law stand-
ards addressed in this Article. First, limiting judicial review to 
abuse of discretion—instead of de novo review—accords proper 
deference to the agency’s expertise in the subject matter and in 
the agency’s procedures. As discussed in Part II.A.1, the Su-
preme Court has enhanced this abuse of discretion standard to 
encourage the agency’s exercise of its expertise by imposing a 
reasoned decision-making requirement: “[T]he agency must ex-
amine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explana-
tion for its action including a ‘rational connection between the 
facts found and the choice made.’”293 Similarly, confining judi-
cial review to the administrative record encourages the agency 
to develop and exercise its expertise by evaluating all relevant 
evidence in its administrative proceeding and providing a rea-
soned explanation for its decision.294 Moreover, remanding er-
 
between Justice Scalia’s exclusive focus on congressional delegation and Jus-
tice Breyer’s additional focus on agency expertise). 
 291. I. PIERCE, supra note 145, § 6.9, at 377. For more on the comparative 
expertise policy justification, see STEPHEN BREYER, BREAKING THE VICIOUS 
CIRCLE: TOWARD EFFECTIVE RISK REGULATION (1993); Lisa Schultz 
Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in the Admin-
istrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 480 n.88 (2003); Emily Hammond 
Meazell, Super Deference, the Science Obsession, and Judicial Review as 
Translation of Agency Science, 109 MICH. L. REV. 733 (2011); Mathew D. 
McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Con-
trol, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 246–47 (1987); Walker, Brand X Doctrine of 
Constitutional Avoidance, supra note 282, at 159–61. 
 292. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
704, 713 (2011) (finding “no reason why our review of tax regulations should 
not be guided by agency expertise pursuant to Chevron to the same extent as 
our review of other regulations”). 
 293. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 
29, 43 (1983) (quoting Burlington Truck Lines v. United States, 371 U.S. 156, 
168 (1962)); accord FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 556 U.S. 502, 513–14 
(2009). 
 294. See, e.g., William W. Buzbee & Robert A. Schapiro, Legislative Record 
Review, 54 STAN. L. REV. 87, 140 (2001) (“Administrative record review fur-
thers two key pillars of the administrative state, legislative supremacy and 
agency expertise. The record requirement ensures that agencies follow the 
WALKER Hoffer_4fmt 11/6/2014 4:19 PM 
2014] TAX COURT EXCEPTIONALISM 275 
 
roneous or incomplete decisions to the agency (instead of the 
court deciding the issue itself) respects the agency’s compara-
tive expertise. As the Supreme Court has explained, by re-
manding, “[t]he agency can bring its expertise to bear upon the 
matter; it can evaluate the evidence; it can make an initial de-
termination; and, in doing so, it can, through informed discus-
sion and analysis, help a court later determine whether its de-
cision exceeds the leeway that the law provides.”295 
The comparative agency expertise justification has less 
force in the Tax Court context—one area where tax 
exceptionalism still has some power. Because the Tax Court is 
a specialized court in tax and hears more tax cases than any 
other federal court, it has greater comparative expertise in ad-
judicating tax matters than its sister federal courts that also 
review IRS actions but are of general jurisdiction.296 To be sure, 
as Professor Lederman observes, “the overwhelming majority of 
Tax Court cases are decided by one judge,” and “[t]ax is a broad 
area, and no judge will have prior experience in every issue.”297 
Notwithstanding that observation, it is probably safe to con-
clude that the expertise gap between the IRS and the Tax 
Court is smaller than between the IRS and other federal 
courts—thus tempering the comparative agency expertise justi-
fication for agency deference in the Tax Court context.298  
More importantly, however, Congress arguably has already 
weighed this difference in expertise when indicating under 
which circumstances the default administrative law principles 
do not apply. As set forth in Part II.B, the default principles do 
not apply when a Tax Court (or any other federal court) reviews 
an IRS determination of a tax deficiency, but they do apply in 
 
congressional mandate and base their decisions on a rational application of 
their expertise to a recognized body of data.”). 
 295. INS v. Ventura, 537 U.S. 12, 17 (2002) (per curiam).  
 296. See Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference, supra note 14, at 1880–81. 
 297. Id. at 1880. Professor Lederman also notes the less obvious observa-
tion that “specialized judging carries (perhaps underappreciated) risks of what 
Professor Lawrence Baum terms ‘assertiveness, insularity, and stereotyping.’” 
Id. at 1882 (citing Lawrence Baum, Probing the Effects of Judicial Specializa-
tion, 58 DUKE L.J. 1667, 1677 (2009)). 
 298. See, e.g., Baum, supra note 297, at 1676 (“What commentators gener-
ally mean when they talk about expertise seems to be the possibility that ex-
pertise will enhance the quality of court decisions: more expert judges, who 
know more about the field in which they are deciding cases, are more likely to 
get decisions right.”); David P. Currie & Frank I. Goodman, Judicial Review of 
Federal Administrative Action: Quest for the Optimum Forum, 75 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1, 67 (“It is obvious that concentrated experience in handling a particular 
category of cases facilitates understanding.”). 
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other contexts such as equitable innocent spouse and collection 
due process claims. This divergence seems to reflect the under-
lying differences in comparative expertise: the Tax Court may 
well be as experienced as the IRS at recalculating taxes owed, 
but not nearly as experienced in dealing with the mechanics of 
tax collection in addition to enforcement or perhaps other ad-
ministrative decisions that implicate the exercise of political 
judgment.299 Professor Cords has advanced this policy argument 
in the collection due process (CDP) context: 
Unlike redetermining a deficiency or reconsidering a request for a re-
fund, courts reviewing CDP determinations are generally reviewing 
matters best left in the discretion of the Service. Congress assigned 
CDP to the Appeals Office. The Service and the Appeals Office have 
expertise regarding collection matters. Moreover, assessing collection 
alternatives, one of the primary reasons for CDP hearings, is uniquely 
within the expertise of the Service.300 
In sum, unlike in other regulatory contexts where the com-
parative expertise rationale may predominate other policy ra-
tionales for judicial deference to agency action, this justification 
carries somewhat less force with respect to the Tax Court’s re-
view of IRS decisions. But it still carries some force, especially 
when Congress has indicated under which circumstances the 
Tax Court should defer to IRS actions. The following policy ra-
tionales reinforce this normative conclusion. 
3. Consistency 
The Supreme Court has justified judicial deference to 
agency action in part on “the value of uniformity in [an agen-
cy’s] administrative and judicial understandings of what a na-
tional law requires.”301 Indeed, in applying Chevron deference to 
IRS regulations, the Mayo Court “expressly ‘[r]ecogniz[ed] the 
importance of maintaining a uniform approach to judicial re-
 
 299. For instance, the IRS’s success in collection due process litigation sug-
gests it has developed significant expertise in the area. Of 116 litigated cases 
reviewed by the National Taxpayer Advocate between June 2011 and May 
2012, taxpayers prevailed fully in eight cases and partially in seven more, 
leaving the IRS with a success rate of 86 percent. NTA 2012 REPORT, supra 
note 272, at 595–96. The IRS prevailed in an even greater percentage of cases 
in prior years—92 percent in 2011, 89 percent in 2010, 92 percent in 2009, and 
90 percent in 2008. Id. at 601. 
 300. Danshera Cords, Collection Due Process: The Scope and Nature of Ju-
dicial Review, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 1021, 1034–35 (2005) (footnote omitted); see 
id. at 1041 (“The court should seldom, if ever, substitute its judgment for that 
of the Service. The Service has vast experience dealing with tax collections.”). 
 301. United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 234 (2001). 
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view of administrative action.’”302 The Tax Court’s refusal to 
apply the APA to its review of IRS determinations implicates 
such consistency on two levels: first, it compromises the judici-
ary’s consistent application of the law as between courts; and, 
second, it impedes the agency’s consistent application of the 
law to similarly situated taxpayers. This raises three specific 
concerns in the context of the Tax Court’s review of IRS actions.  
First, by not deferring to the IRS and instead substituting 
its judgment for that of the agency, the Tax Court inhibits the 
ability of the executive branch (via the IRS) to establish na-
tional policies and practices regarding tax administration. This 
disruption is exacerbated by the fact that, as discussed in Part 
II.B, the Tax Court’s sister courts consider themselves bound 
by the APA’s judicial review standards and thus apply a differ-
ent standard and/or scope of review in certain contexts.303 This 
decentralization has led to forum-shopping opportunities for lit-
igants as well as scholarly calls for tax litigation centraliza-
tion.304 Scholars’ proposals range from the creation of an Article 
III Tax Court,305 or the consolidation of all tax litigation in the 
current Article I Tax Court,306 to the merger of all trial-level tax 
litigation in the then-Board of Tax Appeals and all appeals to a 
new appellate tax court.307 Whereas other reasons for forum 
shopping between the Tax Court and other federal courts may 
persist, consistent judicial review standards would eliminate a 
major reason for such forum shopping. 
Yet another problem with lack of uniformity is unrelated to 
the first but similarly reinforces tax exceptionalism in adminis-
trative law. Because the Tax Court believes itself outside the 
scope of the APA, it has neither contributed to nor drawn from 
the vast case law and judicial experience with reviewing agency 
action. As one commentator has observed, “this isolationist at-
titude has left the area of tax law uninformed by other areas of 
 
 302. Mayo Found. for Med. Educ. & Research v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 
704, 713 (2011) (quoting Dickinson v. Zurko, 527 U.S. 150, 154 (1999)). 
 303. See Lederman, (Un)Appealing Deference, supra note 14, at 1883–85. 
 304. See id. at 1885–91. 
 305. Henry J. Friendly, Averting the Flood by Lessening the Flow, 59 
CORNELL L. REV. 634, 644 n.38 (1974). 
 306. Mitchell M. Gans, Deference and the End of Tax Practice, 36 REAL 
PROP. PROB. & TR. J. 731, 789 (2002). 
 307. Roger J. Traynor, Administrative and Judicial Procedure for Federal 
Income, Estate, and Gift Taxes—A Criticism and a Proposal, 38 COLUM. L. 
REV. 1393, 1425–29 (1938); accord Stanley S. Surrey, Some Suggested Topics 
in the Field of Tax Administration, 25 WASH. U. L.Q. 399, 417–22 (1940) (sup-
porting Justice Traynor’s argument).  
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[administrative] law, depriving the field of cross-fertilization 
with other areas of law.”308 Returning to first principles of ad-
ministrative law would not only align all of the federal courts 
that review IRS actions, but also align tax administrative law 
with the rest of the modern administrative state. Such death of 
tax exceptionalism may provide tremendous benefits to the de-
velopment of tax administrative law and administrative law 
more generally. Part III.B illustrates some of these benefits by 
demonstrating how the Tax Court can incorporate certain dia-
logue-enhancing tools developed in other administrative law 
contexts when remanding matters to the IRS. 
Finally, as Jerry Mashaw has chronicled, normative con-
cerns about consistency in administrative law are not confined 
to judicial review of agency actions, but extend to the actions of 
agencies themselves and their “bureaucratic rationality.”309 If 
the Tax Court’s refusal to apply the APA to its review of IRS 
determinations facilitates inconsistency within the IRS, the 
court’s exceptionalist stance fails as a matter of tax policy. For 
instance, inconsistent administration of tax law creates a prob-
lem not only from the rather obvious normative standpoint of 
equal enforcement,310 but also from that of encouraging societal 
norms of compliance. Compliance norms are important from a 
federal perspective because income tax is self-reported.311 Fur-
thermore, compliance norms may be directly affected by public 
perception of the IRS’s enforcement efforts.312 If the agency’s ef-
 
 308.  Lane, supra note 248, at 166 (citing Leandra Lederman, “Civil”izing 
Tax Procedure: Applying General Federal Learning to Statutory Notices of De-
ficiency, 30 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 183 (1996)); see Lederman, supra, at 183 (argu-
ing that “[t]ax law tends to be uninformed by other areas of law” and that such 
“insularity has the unfortunate consequence of depriving tax and other fields 
of cross-fertilization”).  
 309. JERRY L. MASHAW, BUREAUCRATIC JUSTICE: MANAGING SOCIAL SECU-
RITY DISABILITY CLAIMS 25–26 (1983); see also Robert A. Kagan, Inside Ad-
ministrative Law, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 816, 820 (1984) (explaining that Profes-
sor Mashaw’s concept of “bureaucratic rationality” is a model of administrative 
adjudication that facilitates “[g]reater control and consistency” by placing the 
“overriding value” on “accurate, efficient and consistent implementation of 
centrally-formulated policies”). 
 310. See generally Hoffer, supra note 271, at 318–19 (arguing for “applica-
tion of a broad duty of consistency to the [IRS] would improve the quality of 
written advice while furthering fair administration of the revenue laws”). 
 311. See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforce-
ment in Tax Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1455–59 (2003) (suggesting 
that the system of voluntary compliance is supported by the interaction of 
government enforcement and positive compliance norms). 
 312. Id. at 1488 (reviewing empirical studies of compliance which suggest 
that effective enforcement efforts may positively affect compliance norms). 
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forts are perceived as insufficient or inconsistent, voluntary 
compliance may decrease.313 From both a normative and a 
pragmatic perspective, then, consistent administration is of 
critical importance. 
At first blush, an unmet need for consistent application of 
the law to similarly situated taxpayers seems to support the 
Tax Court’s decision to disregard the APA in favor of de novo 
scope and standard of review coupled with its general refusal to 
remand cases. For example, the IRS’s litigation record in one 
problem area—innocent spouse proceedings—is less successful 
than might be predicted given the presence of a formalized set-
tlement process that requires the agency to consider litigation 
risk. 314 In fact, to a casual observer, the agency’s success rate in 
innocent spouse cases seems no better than a coin flip.315 As a 
result, protection of taxpayer rights may, in some sense, justify 
the court’s exceptionalist stance.  
If inconsistent application of the law by the IRS is confined 
primarily to litigated cases and if the Tax Court itself is con-
sistent in its application of the law, deviation from the APA de-
fault standard and scope of review may further the tax policy 
goal of consistency. Conversely, and more likely, if uneven suc-
cess in litigation is indicative of a larger intra-agency problem 
with consistent application of the law (which might arise from 
sources such as a lack of adequate or clear written procedure in 
a particular area, high employee turnover, or uneven employee 
training), the Tax Court’s exceptionalist stance is of limited use 
in the furtherance of consistency. Only a fraction of innocent 
spouse claimants file appeals with the Tax Court.316 As a conse-
quence, if a problem within the agency gives rise to disparate 
treatment of similarly situated taxpayers, it is probable that 
the court will address only a small fraction of this disparate 
 
 313. See id. 
 314. Although the Priest-Klein model predicts that a success rate of 50 per-
cent would be appropriate in some circumstances, the IRS’s status as a repeat 
player and the presence of a pre-trial dispute resolution process suggest that 
the IRS is underperforming in these cases. For a description of the model, see 
George L. Priest & Benjamin Klein, The Selection of Disputes for Litigation, 13 
J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 (1984). 
 315. See supra notes 272–279 and accompanying text (summarizing statis-
tics). 
 316. Compare IRS 2012 DATA BOOK, supra note 21, at 49 tbl.21 (showing 
that 2703 innocent spouse claims were brought by taxpayers to the IRS ap-
peals office during the 2012 fiscal year), with NTA 2012 REPORT, supra note 
272, at 647 (analyzing forty innocent spouse cases that were heard by courts 
between June 1, 2011 and May 31, 2012). 
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treatment. The latter assumptions of more systemic inconsist-
encies at the IRS seem much more likely. 
Accordingly, the Tax Court’s application of the APA’s de-
fault standard and scope of review—coupled with the ordinary 
remand rule—should increase intra-agency consistency in at 
least three ways. First, as discussed in Part II.A.1, when em-
ploying a “hard look” abuse-of-discretion standard, courts focus 
on the rationality of an agency’s decision and the procedure 
employed to reach it. As a result, the Tax Court’s review for 
abuse of discretion should produce a running commentary on 
the agency’s determinations and provide a basis for improve-
ment within the agency. In contrast, de novo review compels 
the court to reach an independent judgment on the merits, ra-
ther than focusing on the agency’s reasoning. Over time, abuse 
of discretion review of the actual IRS decision would likely pro-
vide a better basis for intra-agency consistency than a trial de 
novo of the underlying issue (without due consideration of the 
IRS’s determination or decision-making process).317  
Second, confining review to the agency record likely will 
force the agency to adopt procedures to work cooperatively with 
claimants to develop facts in the first instance as well as dis-
courage both the IRS and the taxpayers from raising new ar-
guments and evidence for the first time in the Tax Court.318 
Moreover, allowing the submission of new evidence in court 
provides an advantage to a subset of taxpayers—those who ap-
peal—while not providing the same advantage to taxpayers 
who do not appeal. If one assumes all taxpayers have an equal 
opportunity to appeal, consistency is not implicated by the ac-
ceptance of additional evidence. But the more likely reality is 
that differences in sophistication and access to counsel dictate 
that the opportunity to appeal is not equally distributed among 
all taxpayers and that the Tax Court’s acceptance of additional 
 
 317. See, e.g., Leslie Book, The Collection Due Process Rights: A Misstep or 
a Step in the Right Direction?, 41 HOUS. L. REV. 1145, 1172 (2004) (“The em-
phasis on the adequacy of an agency explanation points to the importance of 
the agency’s legal analysis at the time of the administrative determination 
and prevents the agency from offering post hoc justifications at the time of ju-
dicial review.”). 
 318. Steve Johnson has recently expressed concern about applying hard 
look review broadly to IRS adjudication—something that the first-principles 
approach herein advanced would similarly refute as it would only apply when 
the APA default abuse of discretion standard applies—but Professor Johnson 
agrees that hard look should at least apply to collection due process determi-
nations. Steve R. Johnson, Reasoned Explanation and IRS Adjudication, 63 
DUKE L.J. 1771, 1775–77, 1833–34 (2014).  
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evidence may create inconsistency in the administration of tax 
law.  
Finally, the Tax Court’s acceptance of the ordinary remand 
rule should enhance consistency—particularly when coupled 
with abuse of discretion review—because it will force the agen-
cy to recognize and correct its mistakes. Although remand will 
increase the IRS’s workload in the short term, in a world of lim-
ited resources it should create a strong incentive for the agency 
to internalize the Tax Court’s rulings by creating a process that 
will increase the frequency of correct determinations in the first 
instance. For example, the IRS may seek to avoid remand via 
aggressive employee training or creation or clarification of in-
ternal written guidance for employee use, among other things. 
These changes hopefully should lead to improved consistency 
and quality of determinations not just in cases that eventually 
reach the Tax Court but, more importantly, in the vast majority 
of cases that are never appealed.319 
Anecdotal support for this position may be found in the 
contrast between collection due process and innocent spouse 
claims. Unlike innocent spouse claims, collection due process 
denials are reviewed for abuse of discretion,320 remanded to the 
IRS if a taxpayer’s circumstances have changed materially,321 
and, in some circuits, reviewed on the record.322 Although these 
judicial procedures are not identical to the APA default proce-
dures, they are very similar. As a result, if application of the 
APA default increases consistency, one would predict better 
and more formalized IRS procedures relating to collection due 
process claims and better results in litigation.  
Although we only have anecdotal evidence, the IRS proce-
dure is more cohesive and detailed and its litigation record is 
better for collection due process claims than for innocent spouse 
claims. For example, the Internal Revenue Manual, which pro-
vides guidance to IRS employees, devotes an entire chapter, 
containing nine sections, to collection due process.323 In con-
 
 319. This, of course, assumes that Congress will allocate sufficient re-
sources to the agency. We recognize that this assumption may not be realistic. 
 320. See Goza v. Comm’r, 114 T.C. 176, 182 (2000). 
 321. See Churchill v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2011-182 1, 13 (2011). For more 
on remand of collection due process cases, see Leslie Book, A Response to Pro-
fessor Camp: The Importance of Oversight, 84 IND. L.J. SUPPLEMENT 63, 73 & 
n.68 (2009).  
 322. See Murphy v. Comm’r, 469 F.3d 27, 31 (1st Cir. 2006); Robinette v. 
Comm’r, 439 F.3d 455, 460–61 (8th Cir. 2006). 
 323. See I.R.S. IRM, § 8.22 (2014), http://www.irs.gov/irm/part8/index 
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trast, innocent spouse claims receive more cursory treatment, 
meriting scattered references throughout the manual and two 
sections of a single chapter on joint and several liability324—
though the IRS has provided additional guidance to taxpayers 
in the innocent spouse area.325 Similarly, from 2009 to 2013, the 
IRS had a yearly success rate of between 84 percent and 92 
percent in collection due process cases,326 but only between 53 
percent and 65 percent in innocent spouse cases for the same 
years.327 One possible explanation for this disparity is that ap-
proximation of the APA’s default judicial review standards has 
encouraged the IRS to be more conscientious in its internal 
procedures in collection due process cases. And one possible re-
sult of the IRS’s more thorough procedure in collection due pro-
cess cases may be increased consistency in its administration of 
those claims.328  
4. Efficiency 
Another main goal of tax policy and administrative law 
more generally—efficiency—is not well served by the existing 
interaction between the Tax Court and the IRS. Efficiency may 
be conceptualized as the dedication of resources to their highest 
and best use, or the maximization of societal utility.329 The Tax 
Court’s current approach is less efficient at both the agency ad-
 
.html. 
 324. See id. §§ 25.15.8, 25.25.14. The latter of these two sections merely 
provides a coding entry guide for the agency’s record-keeping system. 
 325. See, e.g., Rev. Proc. 2013-34, I.R.B. 2013-43 (Oct. 21, 2013) (providing 
guidance to taxpayers seeking equitable relief under § 6015(f)); Rev. Rul. 2003-
36, 2003-1 C.B. 849 (May 5, 2003) (holding that executor of estate may pursue 
§ 6015 relief on behalf of decedent’s estate); Rev. Proc. 2003-19, 2003-5 I.R.B. 
371 (Feb. 3, 2003) (providing guidance to taxpayers on administrative appeal 
rights of a nonrequesting spouse). Although these forms of guidance may be 
helpful to the IRS, they are not meant for use by taxpayers and do not address 
internal processes of the IRS.  
 326. NTA 2013 REPORT, supra note 273, at 376. 
 327. Id. at 412; NTA 2012 REPORT, supra note 272, at 647; NTA 2011 RE-
PORT, supra note 276, at 659; NTA 2010 REPORT, supra note 276, at 500; NTA 
2009 REPORT, supra note 276, at 490. 
 328. See Leslie M. Book, CDP and Collections: Perceptions and Mispercep-
tions, 107 TAX NOTES 487, 491 (2005) (“The Tax Court’s casting its lot with the 
administrative law mainstream would ultimately provide a more systematic 
basis for taxpayer protection.”). 
 329. See N. GREGORY MANKIW, PRINCIPLES OF MICROECONOMICS 145 (6th 
ed. 2012) (explaining that an allocation is efficient when it maximizes total 
market surplus); Daniel Shaviro, The Rising Tax Electivity of U.S. Corporate 
Residence, 64 TAX L. REV. 377, 396–97 (2011) (defining efficiency as “increas-
ing the size of the pie”). 
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judication stage and the judicial review stage—imposing un-
necessary costs on the IRS and the Tax Court as well as, criti-
cally, the taxpayers. 
One source of inefficiency is the duplication of the agency’s 
work by taxpayers and the Tax Court in litigation. With the use 
of a de novo standard and scope of review, both the taxpayer 
and the IRS develop a case at the agency level and then again 
before the court, costing the government and the taxpayer addi-
tional time and money. As one commentator has noted, “[n]ot 
only does admitting new evidence require an enormous amount 
of time, but it also relegates the IRS essentially to the status of 
an ordinary litigant”—which could lead both parties to “offer 
post-hoc justifications for their actions” and thus add further 
complexity and inefficiency to the judicial review process.330  
A second potential source of inefficiency is poor decision-
making arising from misaligned incentives. If the IRS and the 
taxpayer knew in advance that judicial review would be limited 
to the evidence and issues contained in the administrative rec-
ord (APA record review rule) and the reasoning set forth in the 
IRS’s decision (APA abuse of discretion standard), they would 
be properly incentivized to fully litigate and present their cases 
in the administrative proceeding.331 This is particularly im-
portant in the context of collection due process and innocent 
spouse determinations. As discussed in Part I.B, with respect to 
both of these claims, the agency’s adjudication procedures are 
relatively informal and the incentives to compile a complete 
administrative record and provide a reasoned decision may be 
lacking. Enforcing administrative law’s record review rule and 
the abuse of discretion reasoned decision-making requirement 
should better calibrate those incentives. Leslie Book has made 
this observation in the context of collection due process claims: 
By limiting courts from considering new evidence or agency argu-
ments on appeal, the on-the-record requirement promotes efficient 
resolution of disputes. At the same time, by requiring that agency de-
cisions stand or fall based upon previously submitted and considered 
facts and adequate agency legal analysis and explanation, the on-the-
record requirement helps ensure that agency practices when initially 
 
 330. See Lane, supra note 248, at 160. 
 331. See Book, supra note 328, at 491 (“[F]ailure to abide by the APA’s gen-
eral approach toward reviewing only material before an agency . . . creates 
some risk that the IRS will take less care with its procedures at the hearing 
level.”). 
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considering a matter are sufficient so that courts can adequately re-
view their determinations.332 
Another misalignment of incentives may arise from the 
Tax Court’s refusal to remand cases. When the Tax Court cor-
rects IRS mistakes without requiring additional work from the 
agency, it misses an opportunity to provide the agency with an 
incentive to make a proper determination in the first instance, 
and employees within the agency may have less willingness or 
need to follow the court’s past decisions in future cases.333 As a 
result, the agency’s success rate in litigation may remain low in 
problem areas such as innocent spouse claims—encouraging 
taxpayers to appeal at a higher rate in the future and increas-
ing the rate at which the agency’s work is duplicated by the 
court. Otherwise put, current inefficiency in this context may 
breed greater inefficiency in the future.  
It is important to recognize that remand, itself, has costs. 
It is likely, however, that future efficiency created through the 
iterative process would outweigh current inefficiency created by 
the court’s request that the IRS issue another determination in 
keeping with the court’s decision. Assume, for instance, that 
Congress continues to provide the IRS with fewer resources 
than are needed for optimal function. In such a case, the IRS is 
likely to allocate resources either to their perceived highest and 
best use or in response to political pressure. Or, perhaps 
through inertia, it might maintain a current inefficient alloca-
tion of resources. In any of these cases, persistent remand by 
the Tax Court of cases in problem areas will draw resources 
away from the IRS’s chosen allocation toward the area of per-
sistent remand, focusing the agency’s attention on that area. If 
the agency has a preference for its prior allocation or an aver-
sion to the current inefficiency created by persistent remand, it 
may react by taking steps to lessen the likelihood of future re-
mand. Future efficiency gains from improved agency function 
may, in this context, outweigh current efficiency losses created 
by the remand process. 
 
 332. Book, supra note 317, at 1173; see also Leslie Book, CDP and Collec-
tions: Perceptions and Misperceptions, COMMUNITY. TAX L. REP., Fall/Winter 
2004, at 2, 13 (“Often, better agency practice initially, compelled by the search-
ing light of judicial review into what the agency did, provides more meaningful 
taxpayer protections than the possibility of more searching review.”). 
 333. Lane, supra note 248, at 160 (arguing that the Tax Court’s failure to 
limit its review to the administrative record in collection due process cases 
“may lead more courts to substitute their own judgment for that of the appeals 
officer, causing disincentives for appeals officers to do their jobs properly”). 
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Finally, a third source of inefficiency may arise from reve-
nue foregone as a result of determinations made in favor of 
taxpayers who do not actually qualify for such relief, as well as 
revenue collected from those who are not liable for some or all 
of the amount under the Internal Revenue Code. Let us as-
sume, for the moment, that most people experience declining 
marginal utility of the dollar.334 Next, let us assume (heroically) 
that the federal income tax rate structure is calibrated to pro-
duce an efficient distribution of the cost of government among 
taxpayers in light of declining marginal utility. For most con-
ceptions of efficiency, this will mean that the government col-
lects more, in dollar terms, from those with higher levels of in-
come than from those with lower levels of income. If these 
assumptions are true, the IRS’s under-collection from some 
taxpayers and its over-collection from others may distort distri-
bution of the tax burden in a way that is inefficient. For in-
stance, if the IRS is more prone to under-collect from taxpayers 
at high levels of income, perhaps due to disincentives created 
by these individuals’ access to skilled representation, while it is 
more prone to over-collect from taxpayers at low levels of in-
come due to lack of such representation, the burden of govern-
ment is shifted toward those whose marginal utility of a dollar 
is higher. This would be a clearly inefficient result.335  
In addition, if the IRS is unjustified in its pursuit of some 
cases while failing to pursue those in which it has a valid claim, 
its overall cost of collection is increased, and this is, by defini-
tion, also inefficient.336 If taxpayers perceive that the IRS’s ac-
tions are frequently unjustified, they may expend more than 
the usual amount of resources to protect themselves from gov-
ernment action. The inefficiencies arising from repeated incor-
rect agency determinations would be greatly reduced if the IRS 
reliably could make proper determinations in the first in-
stance—a situation that will remain unlikely so long as the Tax 
 
 334. This common assumption may not be true in all cases. See Sarah B. 
Lawsky, On the Edge: Declining Marginal Utility and Tax Policy, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 904, 907–08 (2011) (empirical evidence suggests some people experience 
increasing marginal utility). 
 335. This, of course, assumes that the government is using tax proceeds 
efficiently and that the difference in actual liability versus collection could not 
be bridged by culling wasteful spending. We recognize that this is, once again, 
a rather heroic assumption. 
 336. See ARTHUR M. OKUN, EQUALITY AND EFFICIENCY: THE BIG TRADEOFF 
96 (Brookings Inst. 1975) (explaining that administrative costs “are 
deadweight burdens of the system and they absorb resources that could be 
serving productive ends”). 
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Court employs de novo review and refuses to adhere to the or-
dinary remand rule.  
5. Equity  
We now return to equity, the policy objective that may mo-
tivate the Tax Court most to review IRS actions de novo.  
Poor agency performance directly implicates traditional 
equity principles in tax policy. Vertical and horizontal equity—
the companion ideas that taxpayers should bear the cost of gov-
ernment in proportion to their ability to pay or as an equal sac-
rifice in light of declining marginal utility of the dollar (verti-
cal), and that similarly situated taxpayers should bear similar 
shares of that cost (horizontal)—are compromised when the 
IRS’s determinations are incorrect.337 Inaccurate calculations of 
taxpayer income and ability to pay draw vertical equity into 
question. Furthermore, it is not possible for an inaccurate ap-
plication of the law across taxpayers to distribute the tax bur-
den equally among all similarly situated claimants. Poor agen-
cy performance thus also compromises horizontal equity.  
Once again, consider innocent spouse claims, and let us as-
sume the IRS’s reversal rate in litigation is indicative of a prob-
lem with the agency’s ability to handle such claims. Now con-
sider that the IRS’s inability to produce equitable results in the 
innocent spouse context is likely exacerbated by the prevalence 
of pro se claimants. For example, in the period between June 
2011 and June 2012, 45 percent of the Tax Court’s thirty-two 
innocent spouse cases were brought by pro se claimants.338 In 
the corresponding fiscal year of the IRS, taxpayers brought 
more than 2703 such claims to the agency’s appeals office.339 
Given these statistics, it is likely that the number of pro se 
claimants appearing before the agency was substantial and 
that very few of them appealed the agency’s determination.340 
 
 337. See generally JOEL SLEMROD & JOHN BAKIJA, TAXING OURSELVES: A 
CITIZEN’S GUIDE TO THE DEBATE OVER TAXES 59–60 (4th ed. 2008) (defining 
vertical and horizontal equity). 
 338. NTA 2012 REPORT, supra note 272, at 647. 
 339. Compare IRS 2012 DATA BOOK, supra note 21, at 49 tbl.21 (2703 inno-
cent spouse claims were brought by taxpayers to the IRS appeals office during 
the 2012 fiscal year), with NTA 2012 REPORT, supra note 272, at 647 (a total of 
forty innocent spouse cases were heard by courts between June 1, 2011 and 
May 31, 2012, including four decisions by courts of appeals and three decisions 
from district courts). 
 340. IRS 2012 DATA BOOK, supra note 21, at 49 tbl.21. Of the 877 cases re-
viewed for the National Taxpayer Advocate’s report on the ten most litigated 
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This inference is troublesome in light of the agency’s track rec-
ord and the presumption that pro se claimants likely earn low-
er levels of income than their represented counterparts.341  
The prevalence of pro se taxpayers in the process may cre-
ate categorical problems with equity. If one subscribes to the 
generally accepted notion that pro se claimants fare worse than 
their represented counterparts in gaining relief, specific devia-
tions from enforcement of an equitable distribution of the tax 
burden may be concentrated among those pro se claimants.342 
Furthermore, to the extent pro se claimants share particular 
traits as a category of claimants, these deviations from an equi-
table distribution may become correlated with possession of 
those traits. For instance, pro se litigants are less likely to have 
the expertise and resources needed to challenge the IRS’s de-
termination in an adversarial context.343 Their lack of an attor-
ney restricts access to expertise, repeat player effects, and ob-
jective assessment of a claim’s merits, among other things.344 
Their chances of success in litigation are thus poorer than their 
represented peers.345 For example, a recent study has found 
 
tax issues of 2013, 63 percent were brought by pro se taxpayers. See NTA 2013 
REPORT, supra note 273, at 324. 
 341. See LEGAL SERV. CORP., DOCUMENTING THE JUSTICE GAP IN AMERICA: 
THE CURRENT UNMET CIVIL LEGAL NEEDS OF LOW-INCOME AMERICANS 1, 1–2 
(2009), http://www.lsc.gov/sites/default/files/LSC/pdfs/documenting_the_ 
justice_gap_in_america_2009.pdf (“Studies show that the vast majority of peo-
ple who appear without representation are unable to afford an attorney . . . .”). 
This study did not look specifically at tax claimants. 
 342. See Leandra Lederman & Warren B. Hrung, Do Attorneys Do Their 
Clients Justice? An Empirical Study of Lawyers’ Effects on Tax Court Litiga-
tion Outcomes, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1235, 124152 (2006) (describing rea-
sons why representation may result in more fruitful litigation outcomes). 
 343. LEGAL SERV. CORP., supra note 341, at 24 (“[T]he vast majority of peo-
ple who appear without representation do so because they are unable to afford 
an attorney.”). As Professor Book has noted in the collection due process con-
text, “Characteristics of many lower-income taxpayers, including language and 
literacy barriers, and a lack of ready access to obtain and copy documentation, 
can contribute to rote rejection.” Book, supra note 328, at 488. 
 344. See Lederman & Hrung, supra note 342, at 124152. 
 345. See NTA 2012 REPORT, supra note 272, at 563 tbls.3.01 & 3.02 (finding 
that in most heavily litigated issues of 2012, pro se taxpayers were less likely 
to prevail in Tax Court); Janene R. Finley & Allan Karnes, An Empirical 
Study of the Change in the Burden of Proof in the United States Tax Court, 6 
PITT. TAX REV. 61, 78 (2008) (analyzing Tax Court cases from July 1991 
through July 2005 and finding that “taxpayers who were represented by at-
torneys won significantly more often than those who appeared pro se”); Le-
derman & Hrung, supra note 342, at 1259–60 (finding that the government 
won significantly less assessed tax in litigated cases where taxpayers were 
represented by counsel than in cases where taxpayers proceeded pro se); Laro, 
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that female litigants are more likely to succeed when repre-
sented than when they appear pro se.346 And it is likely that the 
positive influence of counsel, so thoroughly proven in the litiga-
tion context, extends to agency proceedings as well.347 As a re-
sult, it is possible that poor decision-making at the agency level 
creates a disparate effect across both income and gender lines, 
directly implicating both vertical and horizontal equity. 
These equity concerns may well be motivating the Tax 
Court to conduct more searching review than the APA default 
standards require. But such an approach is misguided. Because 
many pro se claimants do not seek further judicial review of the 
agency’s adverse determinations, the Tax Court’s adoption of a 
de novo scope and standard of review and its refusal to remand 
to the IRS fail as corrective measures in this context. Pro se 
claimants who do not seek review of an improper IRS determi-
nation cannot be protected by the court, unless the court’s deci-
sions in litigated cases somehow affect the agency’s conduct 
systematically. Yet, as discussed in Part III.A.3, a system-wide 
effect on IRS decision-making is unlikely given the court’s re-
fusal to remand as well as its refusal to confine its review to the 
administrative record and the reasoning contained in the IRS’s 
decision. 
In other words, the Tax Court’s use of a plenary standard 
and scope of review and its refusal to remand cases to the IRS 
for redetermination may increase equity relative to a world 
with no judicial review, but the status quo provides little com-
fort for the vast majority of claimants who do not appeal the 
agency’s determination and therefore receive no judicial review. 
The Tax Court has no power to correct mistakes made in these 
 
supra note 15, at 2627 (“[M]ost pro se taxpayers do not adequately know the 
Tax Court Rules or the Federal Rules of Evidence and are thus handicapped in 
the courtroom.”). 
 346. See Stephanie H. McMahon, An Empirical Study of Innocent Spouse 
Relief: Do Courts Implement Congress’s Legislative Intent? 12 FLA. TAX REV. 
629, 66869 (2012). 
 347. To date, there are no empirical studies on this point. Lederman and 
Hrung have shown that in settled Tax Court cases, represented and unrepre-
sented taxpayers fared equally well in dollar terms, but their study does not 
speak to cases in which the taxpayer failed to petition the Tax Court for re-
view. Because these are the majority of innocent spouse cases, it is impossible 
to generalize the results of their study to review of those claims within the 
agency. See Lederman & Hrung, supra note 342, at 1264 (“The lack of any sta-
tistically significant effect of counsel on the IRS’s recovery ratio in settled cas-
es contrasts with the results in tried cases, and suggests that counsel do not 
obtain better settlements than pro se taxpayers do.”). 
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cases, and if one assumes that the IRS has a similarly high er-
ror rate in both reviewed and unreviewed cases, its incorrect 
assessments of income and ability to pay directly affect the eq-
uitable distribution of the cost of federal government. Thus, a 
judicial approach that does not focus on improvement of the 
agency’s system-wide process and outcomes cannot be equity-
maximizing. 
B. JUDICIAL TOOLBOX FOR ENHANCING AGENCY DIALOGUE  
Not only is Tax Court exceptionalism inconsistent with 
blackletter administrative law and the policy concerns that mo-
tivate those legal doctrines, it inhibits the Tax Court from 
drawing on important judicial experience in other administra-
tive law contexts. This Part provides one concrete example—
from the immigration adjudication context—of how the death of 
tax exceptionalism could assist the Tax Court in having a more 
profound, system-wide impact on IRS decision-making.  
As discussed in Part III.A, a critical reason why the Tax 
Court prefers de novo review of IRS actions may be its concern 
that taxpayers will not obtain relief from the IRS that the Tax 
Court believes is due. By limiting review to abuse of discretion 
and prohibiting the court from considering evidence outside of 
the administrative record, the APA limits a reviewing court’s 
ability to grant relief when it feels such relief may be merited. 
Moreover, the Tax Court may prefer to decide an issue itself ra-
ther than remand the matter to the IRS in part because it fears 
a remand to the IRS would unduly delay or, worse, preclude re-
lief as the taxpayer would get lost in the process. The ordinary 
remand rule, of course, expressly prohibits that. 
If the Tax Court did not have such a tax-exceptionalist ori-
entation, however, it would discover that other federal courts 
(and administrative law scholars and practitioners) for decades 
have been struggling with and adapting to these APA and ad-
ministrative common law limitations in a variety of agency con-
texts. Judicial review of agency immigration adjudications, for 
instance, is a somewhat analogous context that has produced 
innovative judicial tools. Federal courts of appeals handle thou-
sands of petitions for review of immigration adjudications each 
year.348 The personal stakes for the noncitizens seeking review 
 
 348. Over the last eight years, the federal courts of appeals have issued 
over 2000 decisions per year in matters appealed from the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals, though the number has decreased each year from 5398 in 2006 
to 2408 in 2013. John Guendelsberger, Circuit Court Decisions for December 
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of removal orders are high—the threat of removal from the 
United States, perhaps to a country where there is a threat of 
persecution—and the noncitizens are often far from sophisti-
cated litigants, often lacking legal representation and even 
English language proficiency.349 Moreover, agency immigration 
adjudication is plagued with reports of agency incompetence 
and inconsistency.350 The most extensive empirical study to 
date, for example, compares the immigration adjudication pro-
cess to “refugee roulette.”351  
In light of the personal stakes, the complexity of immigra-
tion law, the lack of sophisticated litigants, and the document-
ed systemic issues in agency immigration adjudication, one ar-
guably could make a much more compelling case for 
administrative law exceptionalism in immigration than in tax. 
Yet reviewing courts follow general administrative law princi-
ples such as the record review rule and the ordinary remand 
rule; indeed, judicial review is even more deferential than the 
APA default because the Immigration and Nationality Act ad-
justs the standard of review for agency factual determina-
tions352 and even exempts certain matters from judicial review 
altogether.353 Accordingly, the immigration adjudication context 
provides fertile ground for exploring how courts have attempted 
to adapt their approach to have a systemic effect on agency de-
cision-making. And scholars have exerted considerable effort in 
understanding this process. For example, in a recent empirical 
study of over 400 published court of appeals decisions concern-
ing immigration adjudications and the ordinary remand rule, 
one of the authors uncovers a number of findings that merit 
discussion here.354 
 
2013 and Calendar Year 2013 Totals, in IMMIGRATION LAW ADVISOR (Exec. 
Office for Immigration Review, Jan. 2014) at 5–6.  
 349. See Jaya Ramji-Nogales et al., Refugee Roulette: Disparities in Asylum 
Adjudication, 60 STAN. L. REV. 295, 384 (2007). 
 350. Id.  
 351. Id. at 29596; see also Christopher J. Walker, Does the Legal Stand-
ard Matter? Empirical Answers to Justice Kennedy’s Questions in Nken v. 
Holder, 75 OHIO ST. L.J. FURTHERMORE 29, 3334 (2014), http://moritzlaw 
.osu.edu/students/groups/oslj/files/2012/10/Walker-Response-Final.pdf (review-
ing empirical work on systemic issues in immigration adjudication). 
 352. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012) (“[T]he administrative findings of 
fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator would be compelled to 
conclude to the contrary.”). 
 353. See id. § 1252(a)(2) (excluding, inter alia, denials of discretionary re-
lief, orders against criminal aliens, and judicial review of certain legal claims). 
 354. See Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, supra note 40 (manuscript at 
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First, the study reveals that most federal courts of appeals, 
most of the time, follow the ordinary remand rule in the immi-
gration adjudication context. Indeed, while there is much vari-
ance among circuits, the overall compliance rate is above 80 
percent.355 When courts refuse to follow the ordinary remand 
rule, they appear to do so because they are concerned that a 
remand would allow the agency to continue to delay or deny re-
lief when it should not, and thus result in courts abdicating 
their duty to say what the law is and to ensure that procedures 
are fair and rights are protected in the administrative pro-
cess.356 It would be no surprise if the Tax Court often shared 
these concerns about remanding issues to the IRS instead of 
deciding the issues itself. 
Although some courts refuse to remand when they fear un-
due delay or continued denial of meritorious claims by the 
agency, other similarly concerned courts have adhered to the 
remand rule but introduced certain tools aimed at enhancing 
the courts’ dialogue with the agency on remand.357 These tools 
are summarized in the following table.358  
 
Part II.A). 
 355. See id. (manuscript at Part II.A & tbl.1). 
 356. See id. (manuscript at Part II.B). 
 357. These tools are explored at greater length in Parts II.C and III of 
Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, supra note 40. 
 358. This table reproduces part of Table 2 from Walker, The Ordinary Re-
mand Rule, supra note 40. It excludes three tools that were not discovered in 
the cases reviewed but suggested by the author: (1) preliminary injunctive re-
lief; (2) escalation of issue within the executive branch; and (3) escalation of 
issue to Congress. See id. 
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Judicial Toolbox for Agency Dialogue 
 
The Tool The Effect on Dialogue 
1. Notice of Agency Decision 
on Remand 
Signals that court is 
interested in outcome and 
continued dialogue
2. Panel Retention of 
Jurisdiction 
Sends message that the panel 
itself is interested in 
continuing dialogue in the 
event the agency denies relief 
3. Time Limit on Remand Communicates strong interest 
in contiuing dialogue by 
speeding up that conversation 
4. Hypothetical Situations Not only facilitates dialogue 
on remand, but expressly 
starts the dialogue before 
remand
5. Certification of an Issue for 
Remand 
Suggests an agenda for 
remand, which helps frame 
dialogue in the event of 
subsequent judicial review 
6. Government Concessions at 
Oral Argument 
Limit issues on remand and 
focuses court-agency dialogue 
7. Suggestions To Transfer to 
Different Agency Adjudicator 
Attempts to change the 
primary agency speaker in the 
dialogue
 
 
 The use and further development of these judicial tools 
have particular application to the Tax Court and its efforts to 
have a systemic impact on IRS decision-making.359 Unlike re-
fusing to remand an issue—and thus substantively deciding the 
issue for the agency—these tools allow the court to remain part 
 
 359.  As Emily Hammond has observed, the judicial tools uncovered in this 
study “extend[] beyond the immediate context . . . to other types of adjudica-
tions as well as rulemakings.” Emily Hammond, Court-Agency Dialogue: Arti-
cle III’s Dual Nature and the Boundaries of Reviewability, 82 GEO. WASH. L. 
REV. ARGUENDO, (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at Part III) available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2504764; see also Emily H. Hammond, Deference and 
Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 1722, 173971 (2011) 
[hereinafter Hammond, Deference and Dialogue] (examining the dialogue on 
remand in a variety of agency rulemaking contexts).  
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of the dialogue on remand while respecting congressional dele-
gation and the executive breanch’s law-execution responsibility. 
Although a detailed application of these tools to the Tax Court 
context lies outside the ambitions of this Article, the benefits of 
these tools for the Tax Court, which are two-fold, merit prelim-
inary exploration here. 
First, these tools can assist the Tax Court in addressing its 
concerns that an unrepresented taxpayer may get lost in the 
process on remand or that the relief may be unduly delayed or 
denied. As Professor Hammond has observed, the tools can en-
courage swifter resolution of cases on remand to the agency—
addressing one of the greatest concerns of the ordinary remand 
rule and agency decision-making more generally.360 In particu-
lar, consider three of the tools uncovered in the cases: (1) re-
questing notice of the agency decision on remand so as to signal 
the court’s interest in the outcome; (2) retaining jurisdiction 
over the matter on remand so that the case returns to the same 
judge(s) who is already familiar with the case; and (3) placing a 
time limit on remand so as to expedite the process. These all 
signal to the IRS that the Tax Court is interested in a contin-
ued dialogue and a timely (and proper) resolution of the case on 
remand.  
Second, an enriched dialogue in a particular case can have 
systemic effects on agency decision-making. Consider another 
set of three tools uncovered in the study: (1) providing hypo-
thetical solutions in the court’s decision to remand; (2) certify-
ing an issue or issues for remand; and (3) obtaining government 
concessions at oral argument (or in the briefing) to limit the 
open issues on remand. These tools not only help focus the dia-
logue on remand, but they also communicate to the IRS specif-
ic, or even systemic, problems (and accompanying solutions) 
identified by the Tax Court. And they allow the Tax Court to 
suggest potential solutions for the IRS to implement beyond the 
particular case under review. Because these tools consist of 
words and not commands, they comport with a proper separa-
tion of powers and leave discretion for the agency to exercise its 
expertise to address the issues.361  
 
 360.  Hammond, Deference and Dialogue, supra note 359, at 1775. 
 361. Although outside the scope of this Article, it should be noted that a 
reviewing court is not only prohibited from deciding substantive issues itself 
per the ordinary remand rule, but it also cannot order additional agency pro-
ceedings on remand that are not required by the APA or the agency’s govern-
ing statute. See, e.g., Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. 
Council, 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978) (“Agencies are free to grant additional pro-
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The Tax Court’s issuance of written, public opinions allows 
this dialogue to extend beyond the IRS administrators dealing 
with the particular case, including to other similarly situated 
taxpayers and other IRS administrators handling similar 
claims.362 Indeed, such a public dialogue can also reach the 
agency’s principals in Congress and the executive branch.363 By 
adhering to the ordinary remand rule (and the APA default ju-
dicial review provisions) yet utilizing these dialogue-enhancing 
tools, courts can contribute to a properly functioning adminis-
trative state where all three branches of government interact 
and influence agency action. As Professor Hammond has re-
marked, “asking agencies to be equal partners in a dialogue 
enhances participation, deliberation, and legitimacy be-
cause . . . interested parties, Congress, and the courts can more 
easily understand and respond to their reasoning.”364 Indeed, as 
the immigration adjudication study explores further, there are 
a number of ways for the Tax Court to escalate the dialogue 
within the executive branch or with Congress, including the or-
dering of supplemental briefing on certain issues and the call to 
the executive branch and/or Congress for systemic change in its 
written decisions.365  
In sum, if as a normative matter the Tax Court is con-
cerned—as it should be—with horizontal and vertical equity 
and the overall consistency and quality of IRS decision-making, 
it should abandon tax exceptionalism and embrace the APA ju-
dicial review standards, the ordinary remand rule, and the dia-
logue-enhancing toolbox discussed in this Part to engage in a 
richer dialogue with the IRS. Indeed, because the Tax Court 
hears more than 95 percent of all tax litigation366 the Tax 
 
cedural rights in the exercise of their discretion, but reviewing courts are gen-
erally not free to impose them if the agencies have not chosen to grant them.”). 
These constraints are further addressed in Walker, The Ordinary Remand 
Rule, supra note 40, (manuscript at Part III.A). 
 362. From 2000 to 2010, the court released written opinions for over 8,400 
decisions. See 2000-2010 U.S. TAX CT. ANN. REP., supra note 17, at tbl.4. 
 363. See Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, supra note 40 (manuscript at 
Part III.B.23) (providing examples). 
 364. Hammond, Deference and Dialogue, supra note 359, at 1780; see also 
Gillian E. Metzger, Ordinary Administrative Law as Constitutional Common 
Law, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 479, 492 (2010) (“[R]equiring that agencies explain 
and justify their actions also arguably reinforces political controls by helping 
to ensure that Congress and the President are aware of what agencies are do-
ing.”). 
 365. See Walker, The Ordinary Remand Rule, supra note 40 (manuscript at 
Part III.B.23) (exploring further these additional dialogue-enhancing tools). 
 366. Laro, supra note 15, at 18. 
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Court’s ability to have a sustained dialogue with the IRS and 
thus a system-wide effect on the agency may well be much 
greater than in the agency immigration adjudication context 
where numerous federal courts of appeals review such agency 
actions. Moreover, such abandonment of tax exceptionalism 
produces the positive externality of mainstreaming tax with 
other areas of administrative law to allow for cross-
fertilization. The dialogue-enhancing tools discussed in this 
Part are just one illustration of best practices developed in oth-
er regulatory contexts that the Tax Court could incorporate to 
improve its review of IRS decision-making. To date, because the 
Tax Court has considered itself special and separate from gen-
eral administrative law, it has not even begun that exploration. 
  CONCLUSION   
In this Article we have argued that, as a matter of law and 
policy, the Tax Court should return to first principles of admin-
istrative law and abandon its misperception of tax 
exceptionalism. In so doing, the Tax Court should consider it-
self governed by the APA judicial review provisions and accom-
panying administrative law doctrines. Adhering to these rules 
of administrative law—including the ordinary remand rule—
would help the Tax Court improve IRS procedures and deci-
sion-making in a way that its current de novo approach may 
not, by requiring the IRS to better exercise its expertise and by 
facilitating a richer, more systemic dialogue between the Tax 
Court and the IRS. In abandoning tax exceptionalism and em-
bracing administrative law, the Tax Court may also begin to 
more fully benefit from the abundant case law and judicial ex-
perience that federal courts have developed in other adminis-
trative law contexts. 
In light of the Tax Court’s unconventional history and 
longstanding tax exceptionalist view that it is not subject to the 
APA and administrative law doctrines, it may be unrealistic to 
expect the Tax Court to reverse course on its own. The IRS 
must once again assert the applicability of the APA in tax cas-
es.367 The deepening circuit split on this question suggests that 
if the IRS returned to the fight, it would be only a matter of 
time before the Supreme Court intervened and extended its 
 
 367. After the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Wilson, the IRS has taken a step 
back from arguing that the APA default review standards should apply in the 
Tax Court—at least in the equitable innocent spouse claims context. See I.R.S. 
Notice CC-2013-011 (June7, 2013). 
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reasoning in Mayo to reject tax exceptionalism in yet another 
area of tax law. Such judicial intervention would be even more 
likely now that the Ninth Circuit—by far the largest circuit in 
the nation—has joined the Tax Court on the wrong side of the 
circuit split. In the event that the legal case moves too slowly, 
congressional intervention may be warranted to correct course 
and encourage more equitable, efficient, and consistent tax ad-
ministration.368  
In all events, it appears that Tax Court exceptionalism is 
(or at least should be) at death’s door.  
 
 368. For example, recent proposals to provide for Tax Court review of IRS 
determinations of eligibility for § 501(c)(4) social welfare organization status 
could provide Congress with an opportunity to consider the benefits inherent 
in applying the APA default standards to Tax Court review of IRS determina-
tions. See NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, SPECIAL REPORT TO CONGRESS: POLIT-
ICAL ACTIVITY AND THE RIGHTS OF APPLICANTS FOR TAX-EXEMPT STATUS, 
viiviii (June 30, 2013), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/ 
userfiles/file/FullReport/Special-Report.pdf. But see S. 725, 113th Cong. § 14 
(2013) (proposing a de novo scope and standard of review in innocent spouse 
cases that would preserve the problematic status quo).  
